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So when I say that I know me, how can I know that?
What kind of spider understands arachnophobia?
I have my senses and my sense of having senses.
Do I guide them? Or they me?
Overview
The thesis is divided into three parts, each of which is described in the corre-
sponding section of this overview. Part I mainly serves as an introduction to
the contents of Part II and Part III which are, in turn, mutually independent.
Figure 1: Logical dependence of the parts of this thesis
Preliminaries Block ciphers are the main subject of this work and are in-
troduced in Chapter 1. After having described our model for the frameworks
of Substitution-Permutation Networks (SPN) and Feistel Networks (FN), at-
tention is given to the theme of security, with a particular focus on differential
(Chapter 2) and algebraic (Chapter 3) attacks. These are indeed the families
of cryptanalytic techniques the novel contributions of this work belong to.
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Differential cryptanalysis using alternative operations Chapter 4
and Chapter 5 deal with the following problem: is it possible that a block
cipher apparently immune to classical differential cryptanalysis can be at-
tacked considering a different operation on the message space? In [Ber92],
Berson introduced the modular difference to study the MD/SHA family of
hash functions. In [AS11], the authors tried to use a similar method to
cryptanalyse the block cipher PRESENT [BKL+07], featuring a bit-wise
round-key addition. Even though this attempt has been unsuccessful, the
idea of using alternative difference operations is for the first time taken into
consideration and used in block ciphers with a bit-wise key addition. More
recently, Calderini and Sala showed how to effectively compute alternative
operations on a vector space which can serve as message space for a block
cipher such that the resulting structure is still a vector space [CS17]. The
authors used those operations to mount a linearisation attack against a toy
cipher. Here we study similar operations in the differential context, inves-
tigating how alternative operations interact with the layers of an SPN, and
show how they influence the differential probabilities, when the difference
taken into consideration is different from the usual bit-wise addition modulo
two. In particular, in Chapter 4, we study constraints coming from the com-
bination of the bit-wise key addition with these operations, by introducing
and studying the key distribution table. Moreover, we study the differential
uniformity, with respect to other operations, of some non-linear permuta-
tions such as the classical cubic function. In Chapter 5 we designed a 15-bit
block cipher, which presents some similarities with the block ciphers PRINT-
cipher [KLPR10] and PRINCE [BCG+12], and represents an example of SPN
which is resistant against the classical differential attack, with XOR differ-
ences, but it is not resistant against a differential attack which makes use of
alternative difference coming from another operation defined on the message
space.
On the design of wave ciphers Round functions used as building blocks
for iterated block ciphers, both in the case of Substitution-Permutation Net-
works and Feistel Networks, are often obtained as the composition of dif-
ferent layers which provide confusion and diffusion, and key additions. The
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bijectivity of any encryption function, crucial in order to make the decryp-
tion possible, is guaranteed by the use of invertible layers or by the Feistel
structure. In Chapter 6 a new family of ciphers, called wave ciphers, is in-
troduced. In wave ciphers, round functions feature wave functions, which
are vectorial Boolean functions obtained as the composition of non-invertible
layers, where the confusion layer enlarges the message which returns to its
original size after the diffusion layer is applied. This is motivated by the
fact that relaxing the requirement that all the layers are invertible allows to
consider more functions which are optimal with regard to non-linearity. In
particular it allows to consider injective APN S-boxes even in cases where
no APN permutations have been found, e.g. the cases of a number of vari-
ables equals to four or eight, which are optimal for implementation needs.
In order to guarantee efficient decryption we propose to use wave functions
in Feistel Networks. With regard to security, in Chapter 7 we investigate
the immunity from some algebraic attacks. In particular, we focus on the
security from the group-theoretical attack described in [Pat99], where the
author designed a DES-like cipher, resistant to both linear and differential
cryptanalysis, whose encryption functions generate an imprimitive group,
and showed how the knowledge of this trapdoor can be turned into an effi-
cient attack to the cipher. In this work it is shown how to avoid that the
group generated by the round functions of a wave cipher acts imprimitively,
by giving conditions on the Boolean functions composing the layers of the
wave-shaped round functions.
iii
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Notation
The following notation and terminology will be used throughout all this work.
Functions We use the postfix notation for every function evaluation, i.e.
if f is a function and x an element in the domain of f , we denote by xf the
evaluation of f in x. We denote by Im f the range of f and by Y f−1 the
pre-image of a set Y . A vectorial Boolean function is a function from (F2)n
to (F2)m, where n and m are integers, and F2 denotes the finite field with
two elements.
Vectors We denote by V a finite vector space over F2 of dimension n ∈ N.
We assume dim(V ) = n = s × b and write V = V1 ⊕ V2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ Vb, where
dim(Vj) = s for 1 ≤ j ≤ b, and ⊕ represents the direct sum of subspaces,
called bricks. When x ∈ V , for each 1 ≤ j ≤ b we denote by x[j] the s
components of x in the jth brick. The vector x[j] ∈ (F2)s is also called a
brick. The canonical basis for V is denoted by {e1, e2, . . . , en}. For each
1 ≤ j ≤ b the map pij : V → V denotes the canonical projection on Vj. The
Hamming weight of a vector x ∈ V , i.e. the number of non-zero coordinates
of x with respect to the canonical decomposition, is denoted by weight (x).
Each vector in V can be interpreted as a binary number, most significant
bit first, and then represented using the hexadecimal notation. For example,
(0, 0, 0, 1) = 1x and (1, 1, 1, 1) = Fx.
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Fields We denote by F2n the finite field with 2n elements. For each α ∈ F2n ,
the trace of α is defined as Tr(α)
def
= α + α2 + . . . + α2
n−1
. The function
Tr : F2n → F2 is a linear function, where both F2n and F2 are viewed as
vector spaces over F2. Let us also recall that for each α ∈ F2n it holds
Tr(α) = Tr(α2).
Groups If G is any finite group acting on V , for each g ∈ G and v ∈ V
we denote the action of g on v as vg. The group is called an abelian group if
and only if g1g2 = g2g1 for each g1, g2 ∈ G; moreover G is 2-elementary if for
each g ∈ G it holds g2 = 1G, where 1G denotes the neutral element in the
group. The action of G on V is said to be transitive if for each v1, v2 ∈ V
there exixts g ∈ G such that v1g = v2. If for any v1, v2 such g is unique, the
action of G on V is said regular. If H ⊂ G, we denote H < G to mean that
H is a subgroup of G.
The identity matrix over F2 of size ` is denoted by 1`, and the zero matrix
F2 of size ` × h is denoted by 0`,h. The symmetric group acting on V , i.e.
the group of all the permutations on the space V , is denoted by Sym(V ).
The subgroup of Sym(V ) generated by the even permutations, i.e. the per-
mutations obtainable from an even number of two-element swaps, is called
the alternating group and is denoted by Alt(V ). The group of all the affine
permutations of (V,+), which is a primitive maximal subgroup of Sym(V ),
is denoted by AGL(V,+). The group of all the linear permutations of (V,+)
is denoted by GL(V,+). For any linear map λ ∈ GL(V,+) we denote by
Ker(λ) the kernel of λ. The group of the translations of V is denoted by
T+
def
= {σa | x 7→ x + a, a ∈ V } < Sym(V ). Sometimes, when it is important
to highlight the dimension of the vector space the translations are acting on,
we denote T+ by Tn.
x
Part I
Preliminaries
1
1Introduction to block ciphers
In this first chapter the main subjects of this work, i.e. block ciphers, are
introduced. Some preliminary results are shown and the notations used along
the thesis are explained. This presentation as well as the one of Chapter 2
is inspired, among others, by the following references [Rij97, DR13, KR11,
LMM91].
1.1 Block ciphers
Block ciphers start to play a role in the security of the today’s communica-
tions between two parties whenever the parties agree on a secret and shared
key by means of whatever asymmetric cryptosystem. A block cipher is a
symmetric primitive which, taking as input a fixed-length block of a mes-
sage and a parameter called key, transforms the former into a string of the
same length n, in such a way that only authorised parties can access it.
More precisely, a block cipher is a set of permutations defined on a message
space M, each of which is indexed by the key parameter, called encryption
functions. The operation of transforming the message, also called plaintext,
into the output of the parametrised encryption function, called ciphertext, is
called encryption, whereas the reverse process is called decryption. In order
to describe a block cipher, it is required to define the process for obtaining
the encryption function once the key is chosen in the key space K. This
is done, according to the Kerckhoffs’s principle [Ker83], by making public
2
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all the procedures and keeping secret only the key, since “it should not be a
problem if it [the cipher’s description] falls into enemy hands”. Moreover, for
the above-mentioned procedures, a relatively simple description is required,
and the following properties need to be satisfied:
efficiency there exists an efficiently computable procedure which, for any
message in the message space and any key in the key space, provides the
encryption of the given message with the current encryption function,
preferably on a wide range of platforms / devices. The same should
hold for the decryption process;
security the #K key-induced permutations should look like being chosen
uniformly at random in the set of all the possible permutations of the
message space, in such a way it is not possible, given a text, to predict
whether it is a ciphertext of a randomly-generated string of the same
length.
The second ideal requirement incidentally means that, parties not entitled
to access the encrypted data recover no information on the plaintext when
the ciphertext is given but the key used for the encryption is unknown. Such
parties are called attackers or cryptanalysts, usually depending on whether
one wants to put the accent on their bad or good intentions, respectively.
The following is a very general definition of block cipher.
Definition 1.1.1. LetM and K be non-empty sets. A block cipher Φ is an
injective function K → Sym(M). The set M is called the message space,
K the key space, and the permutation EK def= KΦ is called the encryption
function induced by the key K. The set {EK | K ∈ K} is called the set of
the encryption functions. It is common to identify
Φ ≡ KΦ = {EK | K ∈ K} ⊂ Sym(M).
1.1.1 Perfect secrecy
Is his seminal work [Sha49], Shannon gave a formal definition of security for
block ciphers, which basically requires that the security of the cryptosystem
3
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does not rely on assumptions on the computational capabilities of the adver-
sary, i.e. the cipher is unbreakable even if the computational power of the
adversary is not bounded. Before recalling Shannon’s definition of perfect
secrecy, let us consider the plaintext P and the key K as random variables.
Let us assume that a probability distribution PM on M is given, in such a
way we can denote by PM[P = p] the probability that the plaintext p ∈ M
occurs. Moreover, let us consider a probability distribution PK on K, inde-
pendent on P , such that PK[K = k] denotes the probability that the key
k ∈ K is chosen. Let us consider the random variable C : M× K → M
defined by (p, k)C = pEk, where M× K is equipped with the probability
distribution PM,K = PM × PK.
Definition 1.1.2. A block cipher Φ is said to have perfect secrecy if for each
p, c ∈M it holds
PM,K[P = p | C = c] = PM[P = p].
The notion of perfect secrecy means that the a posteriori distribution of the
plaintext P when the value of ciphertext C is known, is equal to the a priori
distribution of the plaintext, i.e. that an attacker obtains no more informa-
tion on the plaintext when the ciphertext is known.
The following characterisation of the perfect secrecy is due to Shannon.
Theorem 1.1.3. Let Φ be a block cipher and let us assume that #M = #K.
Then Φ has perfect secrecy if and only if for each p, c ∈ M there exists a
unique k ∈ K such that pEk = c and PK is uniform, i.e. for each k ∈ K it
holds PK[K = k] = 1/#K.
A well-known example of cipher with perfect secrecy is the one-time pad
[Mil82], which is however important only from a theoretical point of view,
since it is not easy to give a practical implementation of the cipher.
4
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1.2 Iterated block ciphers
In the second part of this work, Shannon introduced the concepts of confu-
sion and diffusion to guide the design of practical ciphers. Those are today
considered cardinal principles for obtaining the properties of security and
efficiency discussed before:
confusion the ciphertext statistics should depend on the plaintext statistics
in a manner too complicated to be exploited by the cryptanalyst;
diffusion the encryption spreads out of the influence of a single plaintext
digit over many ciphertext digits so as to hide the statistical structure
of the plaintext.
Since a cipher should not only be difficult to break, but it must also be
easy to use (i.e. to encrypt and decrypt when the secret key is known),
a very common approach for creating diffusion and confusion is to use a
product cipher, i.e., a cipher that can be implemented as a succession of simple
ciphers, each of which adds its modest share to the overall large amount
of diffusion and confusion [Mas88]. This idea leads to the definition of an
iterated cipher, which is the most common framework nowadays for block
ciphers. What follows is a general definition of iterated cipher.
Definition 1.2.1. The block cipher Φ = {EK | K ∈ K} is called an iterated
block cipher if there exists R ∈ N such that for each K ∈ K the encryption
function EK is the composition of R functions, i.e. EK = ε1,K ε2,K . . . εR,K .
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ R, the function εi,K is called the round function for the ith
round of the encryption function EK .
To provide efficiency, each round function is the composition of a public
component provided by the designers, and a private component derived from
the user-provided key by means of a public procedure known as key-schedule.
As we will discuss later in detail, each component of the cipher is designed
to fulfil its specific purpose. In this first informal description of the block ci-
phers’ fundamentals, we can describe the components of each round function,
also called layers, in this way:
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confusion layer is designed to provide the Shannon’s principle of confusion
by replacing certain blocks of bits of the state with other blocks of bits,
following a specific rule. The relation between the input and the output
of the confusion layer is designed to be as complex as possible, hence
look-up tables are usually required in implementation;
diffusion layer is designed to provide the Shannon’s principle of diffusion
by rearranging the bits of the block in such a way that a change in one
bit of the state affects as much bits as possible. Such a layer usually
operates simple manupulations on the bits of the block;
key-addition layer is the only layer of the cipher whose input is not public.
It makes all the bits of the block dependent on a user-selected key in
the manner intended by the designers of the cipher.
In the theory of modern iterated block ciphers, two frameworks are mainly
considered: Substitution-Permutation Networks (SPN) (see e.g. AES [DR13],
PRESENT [BKL+07], SERPENT [BAK98]) and Feistel Networks (FN) (see
e.g. DES [Pub77], Camelia [AIK+00], GOST [Dol10]). Figure 1.1 depicts the
more general framework of SPNs, FNs and their round functions; one can
note that inside the round function of an FN, a function called F-function is
applied to a half of the state. In both cases, the principles of confusion and
diffusion suggested by Shannon [Sha49] are implemented by considering each
round function / F-function as the composition of key-induced permutations
as well as non-linear confusion layers and linear diffusion layers, which are
invertible in the case of SPNs and preferably (but not necessarily) invertible
in the case of FNs. These two families are briefly discussed in the following
sections.
1.2.1 Substitution-Permutation Networks
The framework of SPNs has been widely studied in the last years, and nowa-
days is known especially as the basic structure of the current U.S. encryption
standard AES [DR13]. In an SPN the block is divided into multiple smaller
bricks, each brick becomes the input of a non-linear function (S-box), then
6
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Figure 1.1: Round function of an SPN and of an FN
the bits of the block are mixed by means of a linear function. The key addi-
tion may occur before or after these two operations. The following definition
gives a mathematical description of SPNs in the model we will be using
throughout this work. In this case we are assuming M = V .
Definition 1.2.2. An R-round iterated cipher Φ is called a Substitution-
Permutation Network (SPN) if Φ is a family of encryption functions {EK |
K ∈ K} ⊂ Sym(V ) such that for each K ∈ K the map EK is the composition
of R round functions, i.e. EK = ε1,K ε2,K . . . εR,K , where εi,K = γλσki and
• γ ∈ Sym(V ) is a non-linear bricklayer transformation which acts in a
parallel way on each Vj, i.e.
(x1, x2, . . . , xn)γ =
(
(x1, . . . , xs)γ1, . . . , (xs(b−1)+1, . . . , xn)γb
)
.
The maps γj ∈ Sym(Vj) for each 1 ≤ j ≤ b are traditionally called
S-boxes ;
• λ ∈ Sym(V ) is a linear map;
• σki : V → V, x 7→ x + ki represents the key addition, where + is the
usual bit-wise XOR on F2. The round keys ki ∈ V are usually derived
from the master key K by means of a public algorithm, called key-
schedule. Using the terminology developed later in this work, we say
that the key addition defines a translation of ki to the vector x.
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λ
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γ′ γ′ γ′ γ′
Figure 1.2: Example of 1-round encryption of an SPN
The function ρ
def
= γλ is called the generating function of the SPN. For each
1 ≤ r ≤ R we denote by E(r)K the composition of the first r round functions
of the encryption function EK . In particular EK = E
(R)
K . Figure 1.2 displays
the structure of a round function for an SPN.
For example, for the classical AES-128 cipher a 10-round encryption is
performed and 8-bit S-boxes are implemented. The state is arranged into a
4 × 4 matrix of bytes and the diffusion layer is a combination of ShiftRows
and MixColumns: in the former the last three rows of the state are shifted
cyclically, whereas in the latter a mixing operation which operates on the
columns of the state combining the four bytes in each column is applied
[DR13]. Instead PRESENT, briefly described also in Section 1.2.2, manip-
ulates 4-bit S-boxes; the diffusion is granted by a permutation matrix. The
designers have estimated that the iteration of 31 rounds gives a sufficient
margin of security to the cipher [BKL+07].
Remark 1.2.3. Notice that a bit-wise XOR addition is not the only possible
way to define a key-addition layer. In many modern ciphers, the key addi-
tion is performed e.g. by considering a modular addition. However, for the
purposes of this work, when studying SPNs, only key-addition layers induced
by the bit-wise sum modulo 2 will be considered. Moreover, Definition 1.2.2
does not include, for sake of simplicity, atypical rounds of the cipher, since
it is out of the scope of this work. However, it is worth mentioning that in
many ciphers the first and the last round, for efficiency and security reasons,
may be different from the others. For example, it is common that in the
first or in the last round only the key-addition layer is applied (whitening
8
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x 0x 1x 2x 3x 4x 5x 6x 7x 8x 9x Ax Bx Cx Dx Ex Fx
xS Cx 5x 6x Bx 9x 0x Ax Dx 3x Ex Fx 8x 4x 7x 1x 2x
Figure 1.3: The S-box S of PRESENT
or post-whitening process) and in several ciphers the diffusion layer is not
applied in the last round.
Notice that, since every round function is composed by invertible layers,
the decryption can be performed by applying the inverse of the layers to the
ciphertext, in reverse order.
1.2.2 PRESENT
The block cipher PRESENT [BKL+07] has been designed in 2007, for the
purpose of being a lightweight cipher, i.e. a cipher suitable for hardware
implementation in low-power devices or constrained environments such as
RFID tags and sensor networks. It is an example of SPN and consists of 31
rounds. The block length is 64 bits and two key lengths of 80 and 128 bits
are supported. The encryption functions are induced by 32 round-keys, 31
of which are used in the standard rounds and the remaining one is used in
the last and atypical round for post-whitening. Typically the round function
is unique and is obtained as the composition of the following three layers:
addRoundKey the 64-bit round key, derived by the designed key-schedule
[BKL+07], is XOR-ed to the partial state;
sBoxlayer the 64-bit block is split into 16 4-dimensional bricks, each of these
is substituted in accordance with the S-box S ∈ Sym(F2)4 displayed in
Fig. 1.3;
pLayer with the convention that the left-most bit of the block is in position
0, and the right-most in position 63, for each 0 ≤ i ≤ 63 the bit of the
state in position i is moved to position P (i), where the permutation P
9
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S
S
S
S
ki
ki+1
Figure 1.4: A 2-round encryption of PRESENT
is defined as follows
P (i)
def
=
16× i mod 63 0 ≤ i < 6363 i = 63.
Figure 1.4 displays the composition of two typical round functions of
PRESENT.
1.2.3 Feistel Networks
Besides SPNs, many modern ciphers and their precursors are based on the
framework of Feistel Networks, which became popular when the U.S. Federal
Government adopted the DES as the standard encryption algorithm for the
protection of sensitive, unclassified electronic government data. This cipher,
derived from the block cipher Lucifer designed by Horst Feistel and Don Cop-
persmith in 1973, has been withdrawn in the end of the nineties, mainly due
to its short key-length (56 bits). However, its study has highly influenced the
advancement of modern cryptography, both in the direction of understanding
the properties of FNs and developing new cryptanalytic techniques.
Similarly to SPNs, a 2n-bit Feistel Network consists of the repetition of
R rounds of an identical structure. This repeated structure is realised by
means of the so-called F -function and a swap operation. The F -function
maps a n-bit input into a n-bit output under the action of a set of round
10
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F
xi,R
⊕
Ki
xi,R
⊕
F⊕
Ki+1
⊕
x(i+2),L′ x(i+2),R′
Figure 1.5: Example of 2-round encryption of a FN
keys. Such a function encrypts the right half of the state, which is then
XOR-ed to the remaining part of the message. The two halves of the current
state are then swapped and the round is repeated. Feistel Networks usually
include an atypical last round, where no swap is performed. An example of
2-round encryption of an FN is illustrated in Fig. 1.5.
Let us now describe more formally this procedure.
Definition 1.2.4. Let f : (F2)n → (F2)n be a vectorial Boolean function.
We denote by f the formal operator f : (F2)2n → (F2)2n
f
def
=
(
0n 1n
1n f
)
,
which for any (x1, x2) ∈ (F2)n× (F2)n acts as (x1, x2)f def= (x2, x1 +x2f). The
operator f¯ is called the Feistel operator induced by f .
The operator previously defined allows to give an algebraic description of
FNs, which are defined on the message space M = V × V .
Definition 1.2.5. An R-round iterated cipher Φ is called a Feistel Network
(FN) if Φ is a family of encryption functions {EK | K ∈ K} ⊂ Sym(V × V )
such that for each K ∈ K the map EK is the composition of R key-dependent
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Feistel operators, i.e. EK = ε1,K ε2,K . . . εR,K , where εi,K : V → V for
1 ≤ i ≤ R.
Feistel operators are usually designed in accordance to the Shannon’s
principles, i.e. contain layers providing confusion and diffusion. The key-
addition layers may be designed in several ways, more frequently they are
induced from the XOR or from a modular addition. Notice that, as in the
case of Definition 1.2.2, we do not include possible atypical rounds in the
definition of the cipher.
Remark 1.2.6. One advantage of the Feistel Network is that the decryp-
tion process is identical to encryption, provided the round keys are taken in
reverse order. Moreover, notice that a Feistel operator f¯ is always invertible,
regardless the invertibility of f , and it has the following inverse
f
−1
=
(
f 1n
1n 0n
)
.
It is indeed easy to check that
(x2, x1 + x2f)
(
f 1n
1n 0n
)
= (x1, x2).
The cipher presented in the following section is a FN with an easy de-
scription.
1.2.4 GOST 28147-89
Developed in the 1970s, the cryptosystem GOST has been kept secret since
the dissolution of the USSR, when it was declassified and it was released to
the public in 1994. The cipher was a soviet alternative to the U.S. standard
DES, with whom it shares a similar structure. It is a 64-bit FN with a key-
length of 256 bits. Each Feistel operator applies to the 32-bit right half of
the state a key-dependent F-function where confusion is provided by means
of a parallel layer made up by 4-bit S-boxes, diffusion is provided by a left
rotation of 11 bits, whereas the key is added to the state by means of an
addition modulo 232. The full description of the variant GOST 28147-89
may be found e.g. in [Dol10].
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1.3 Classical round functions
After having presented the main differences between SPNs and FNs, we intro-
duce the notion of classical round function, which allows to describe formally
both cipher families in a unified way, provided the round key is used as a
translation (i.e., the key addition is the usual XOR). The family of classical
round functions for iterated block ciphers of our model is large enough to
include the round functions of well-established SPNs e.g. AES, PRESENT,
SERPENT, and the F-function of FNs like Camelia. Notice that, for sake of
simplicity, atypical rounds are again not considered in this description.
Definition 1.3.1. For each k ∈ V , a classical round function induced by k
is a map εk ∈ Sym(V ) of the type εk = γλσk, where
• γ : V → V is a non-linear permutation (parallel S-box) which acts in a
parallel way on each Vj, i.e.
(x1, x2, . . . , xn)γ =
(
(x1, . . . , xs)γ1, . . . , (xs(b−1)+1, . . . , xn)γb
)
,
applying the S-box γj : Vj → Vj to the jth brick;
• λ ∈ Sym(V ) is a linear map,
• σk : V → V, x 7→ x+ k represents the addition with the round key k.
When used inside block ciphers, the round keys in V are derived by the
designer-provided key-scheduling function from the master key K ∈ K.
Since, as we will discuss later in detail, studying the role of the key-schedule
is out of the scope of this work, one can simply assume that round keys are
randomly-generated vectors in V .
It is important to recall here that, even though the terms “SPN” and
“FN” refer to a larger variety of ciphers (i.e. different key-addition or a differ-
ent arranging of the layers may be considered), for the purposes of this work
we choose to focus only on ciphers with a XOR-based key addition. For this
reason, saying SPN we refer to any cipher {EK | K ∈ K} ⊆ Sym(M) having
an SPN-like structure withM = V and having classical round functions on V
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as round functions, and saying FN to any cipher {EK | K ∈ K} ⊆ Sym(M)
having an FN-like structure with M = V × V and having classical round
functions on V as F-functions. Moreover, we assume that the Feistel oper-
ators defining an FN are of the type of εi,K , where εi,K is a classical round
function as in Definition 1.3.1. Hence, as in the case of SPNs, we refer to
ρ
def
= γλ by saying the generating function of the Feistel Network.
1.4 Cryptanalysis
When dealing with a new cryptosystem, one of the main issues is to define
how its security can be evaluated. A first classification of the security of
a block cipher, which was introduced in [Knu94a], can be made consider-
ing the possible outcomes of the attacks, here listed in ascending order of
dangerousness:
key recovery the attacker finds the secret key K used for the encryption;
global deduction the attacker finds a function which is equivalent to the
encryption function EK , without knowing the key K;
local deduction the attacker manages to encrypt or decrypt one message,
which he did not obtain from the legitimate sender;
information deduction the attacker recovers some bits of the key or of
the plaintext, which he did not get directly from the sender and which
he did not have before the attack;
distinguishing attack the attacker can effectively distinguish between two
black boxes, one containing the block cipher with a randomly chosen
encryption key and the other containing a randomly chosen permuta-
tion over the same space.
A second classification is usually done in terms of the capabilities of the
attacker to collect information. The aim of the attacker being to recover
(partial) information on the key, the following scenarios are considered:
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ciphertext-only the attacker has access to some ciphertexts, and has no
access to the corresponding plaintexts. This information is the easiest
an attacker can gain access to, since the attacker only needs to intercept
the messages of an encrypted conversation. However, today’s cipher are
very unlikely vulnerable to this kind of attack;
known-plaintext the attacker has access to a number of pairs of plaintexts
and the corresponding ciphertexts, encrypted with the unknown key;
chosen-plaintext the attacker has access to an encryption oracle which can
provide the encryption with the same key of a set of messages provided
by the attacker;
adaptive chosen-plaintext the attacker can behave several time as in the
chosen-plaintext scenario. After viewing and analysing the output of
the oracle, the attacker can make new queries;
related-key the attacker has access to the encryption of the same plain-
text using unknown keys which are related to the target key in some
mathematical way;
side-channel it is not an attack to the mathematical structure of the ci-
pher but rather to its implementation. The attacker exploit external
facts related to the encryption / decryption process, such as electric
noise, power consumption, computation time etc., to recover (partial)
information of the plaintext or on the key used.
The attacks are listed here in ascending order of data required to the at-
tacker, i.e. from the most practical to the most impractical. Since a proof of
the security of a block cipher from every attack can almost never be given,
focusing on rather impractical attacks, as the lasts in the list, gives a suffi-
ciently reasonable margin of safety.
To conclude, the success of a cryptanalytic attack can be measured in
terms of the effort required for the attack to be performed. In particular, we
focus is usually put on the following parameters:
15
Cryptanalysis
time complexity the time needed to perform an attack, measured in terms
of operations the attacker needs to perform;
memory complexity the storage needed to perform the attack;
data complexity the amount of data to obtain in order to perform the
attack.
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In this chapter, the attack of differential cryptanalysis is described. Later
in this work, we generalise the attack to the case of alternative difference
operators.
2.1 Description of the attack
Differential cryptanalysis was publicly introduced by Biham and Shamir in
the beginning of the 90’s [BS91a] as a powerful tool to cryptanalyse some
cryptographic primitives, including mainly block ciphers. It is today known
that the IBM designers of DES were already aware of the differential attack
before it was published, and consequently designed the cipher in way to be
resistant against the attack. However, for a matter of national security, they
were asked by the NSA to keep the cryptanalytic technique secret. After
the attack was published, many block ciphers were cryptanalysed using this
method [BS91b, BS91c, BAB93, RP94]. The idea has later been widely
generalised and many variants have been introduced in recent years [Knu94b,
BBS99, Knu98]. We will refer to the Biham’s and Shamir’s attack by saying
the classical differential attack.
Informal description Let us recall that we denote by V a plaintext /
ciphertext space, where V = (F2)n. The classical differential cryptanalysis is
a chosen-plaintext attack, where the difference between plaintexts is fixed.
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For any x and y in V , the difference between x and y with respect to ∗ is
defined as diff(x, y)
def
= x ∗ y−1, where ∗ is any group operation on V , and
y−1 is the inverse of y with respect to ∗. In order a cipher to be secure
against the larger class of attacks, we expect its encryption functions to
destroy patterns in the plaintexts. For example, let P be a set of pairs P
def
=
{(x1, x2) | x1, x2 ∈ V, diff(x1, x2) = ∆}, where all the corresponding elements
in a pair have difference fixed to a given value ∆ ∈ V , i.e.
# {diff(x1, x2) | (x1, x2) ∈ P} = 1.
Let now E be an encryption function of the cipher and let C be the set
obtained by encrypting every pair in P with the same encryption function
E, i.e. C
def
= {(x1E, x2E) | (x1, x2) ∈ P}. Since the function E is an encryp-
tion function, we expect that it is not possible to predict the difference of
corresponding message in a pair after the encryption is performed (output
difference), i.e. we expect that
# {diff (y1, y2) | (y1, y2) ∈ C} = # {diff (x1E, x2E) | (x1, x2) ∈ P} ∼ #P.
Notice that, when P contains all the possible pairs having difference fixed
to ∆, then #P = 2n−1. If it happens that there exists a suitable differ-
ence ∆ ∈ V such that, even if the key is unknown, it is possible to predict
the difference after the encryption with a relatively high probability, then
the cipher is vulnerable to differential cryptanalysis. Stated differently, if
some differences propagate with unusually high or low probability during the
encryption process, this leads to a non-uniform distribution of the output
differences which may be used to show a non-random behavior of the cipher.
In order to attack an R-round iterated cipher, in the classical setting, the
cryptanalyst needs to choose an input difference ∆I which, after a partial
encryption of R − 1 rounds, corresponds to an output difference ∆O with a
significantly high probability p. Then he can proceed as follows:
• he generates a set of pairs P def= {x | x ∈ V 2} with the property that for
each x = (x1, x2) ∈ P it holds diff (x1, x2) = ∆I ;
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• he submit P to an encryption oracle, which encrypts each pair with a
target keyK, and obtains the set C
def
= {diff (x1EK , x2EK) | (x1, x2) ∈ P};
• for each pair in C he performs a partial decryption for each message of
the pair, trying to guess the round key used in the last round, and he
increments a counter every time for the selected round key the difference
of the partially decrypted messages equals the expected value ∆O;
• after the previous step is performed for all the round keys of interest, he
chooses the round key candidate with the highest value in its counter.
Assuming that if messages are partially decrypted with the wrong round
key then their differences are uniformly distributed, if the probability p is
sufficiently high the cryptanalyst succeeds in recovering some bits of the last
round key.
2.2 Classical differential cryptanalysis
Although differences can be computed with respect to every operation ∗ such
that (V, ∗) is a group, in general the difference taken into consideration de-
pends on the operation that is used to perform the key addition. In the case
of the SPNs, for example, this operation is usually the XOR, since the key
addition is performed by XOR-ing the round key bits with the bits of the
message. However, keeping in mind that the scope of this work is to crypt-
analyse an SPN using an operation different from the XOR, we will describe
classical differential cryptanalysis with respect to a general group operation
∗. In order to keep the notation lighter, when it is clear from the context,
we will not write explicitly the dependence on the operation ∗.
Let us consider Φ = {EK | K ∈ K} < Sym(V ) an R-round iterated block
cipher, let 1 ≤ r ≤ R and let ∗ be a group operation on V . Let us denote by
diff the difference operator induced by ∗.
Definition 2.2.1. A pair (∆I ,∆O) ∈ V 2 is called a differential. The elements
∆I and ∆O are called input difference and output difference, respectively.
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Actually we are not interested in the concept of the differential itself, but
rather in its probability.
Definition 2.2.2. Let f ∈ Sym(V ), and let (∆I ,∆O) ∈ V 2 be a differential.
The differential probability of the differential (∆I ,∆O) with respect to f and
to the operation ∗ is
p f∆I (∆O)
def
=
# {x | x ∈ V, diff (xf, diff (x,∆I)f) = ∆O}
#V
,
which represents the probability that given any two messages with input
difference ∆I , i.e. x and diff (x,∆I), it holds that the corresponding output
difference is ∆O, i.e. diff (xf, diff (x,∆I)f) = ∆O, where x is uniformly
distributed on V . If p f∆I (∆O) > 0 we say that the differential (∆I ,∆O) is
admissible over f . Moreover, if p f∆I (∆O) = 1, we say that the differential
p f∆I (∆O) is deterministic over f , and if p
f
∆I
(∆O) = 0 that the differential
(∆I ,∆O) is impossible over f .
Remark 2.2.3. Let f ∈ Sym(V ) and let (∆I ,∆O) be an admissible differ-
ential over f . Then, since f is bijective it holds
∆I = 0⇔ ∆O = 0.
Definition 2.2.4. Let f ∈ Sym(V ), (∆I ,∆O) ∈ V 2 be a differential, and let
x ∈ V . We say that the pair (x, diff (x,∆I)) follows the differential (∆I ,∆O)
with respect to f if diff (xf, diff (x,∆I)f) = ∆O.
As already mentioned, in a real case scenario, the key used for the en-
cryption is unknown to the attacker. For this reason, we need to extend
the notion of differential probability to the case when the function used is
unknown.
Definition 2.2.5. Let (∆I ,∆O) be a differential. The differential probability
of the differential (∆I ,∆O) with respect to Φ
(r) is the expected value of the
differential probability of (∆I ,∆O) with respect to E
(r)
K , assuming that the
keys are uniformly distributed on K, i.e.
pΦ
(r)
∆I
(∆O)
def
=
∑
K∈K
p
E
(r)
K
∆I
(∆O) · 1
#K .
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When looking at a differential (∆I ,∆O) with the intention of studying its
differential probability with respect to Φ(r), we will also call (∆I ,∆O) an r-
round differential. If it is clear that (∆I ,∆O) denotes an r-round differential,
then pΦ
(r)
∆I
(∆O) is also written simply as p∆I (∆O).
Notice that, in the context of a differential attack, only plaintexts can be
chosen by the attacker, whereas the key used for the encryption in unknown.
In our definition of differential probabilities, however, we are assuming that
the plaintexts and the keys are independent and uniformly random. These
probabilities will be used to determine the best differential suitable to perform
the attack. Hence, we are tacitly assuming that, for a given differential
(∆I ,∆O), the differential probability for a chosen key equals its expected
value p∆I (∆O). This hypothesis is known with the name of hypothesis of
stochastic equivalence [LMM91].
Definition 2.2.6. The best differential probability over Φ(r) is defined as
pmax
def
= max
∆I 6=0,∆O
pΦ
(r)
∆I
(∆O).
Each differential (∆I ,∆O) such that p
Φ(r)
∆I
(∆O) = pmax is called the best
differential over Φ(r).
The size of the value pmax reflects the security of the cipher in terms of
resistance against the standard differential attack. In particular, the cipher
Φ is secure with respect to the classical differential cryptanalysis if it is not
possible to detect a relevant bias in the distribution of all the possible r-
round differentials, when r is close to the actual number of rounds R of
the cipher. More precisely, we can assume that the cipher is secure if no
r-round differential (r close to R) has probability different enough from 2−n
so that it is possible to distinguish the set of parametrised permutations from
a random one. However, for a real-size cipher, the problem of determining
the best r-round differential cannot practically be solved. For this reason,
an approximation of this value is required.
Definition 2.2.7. Every sequence (∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆r) ∈ V r+1 is called an r-
round differential trail. Given a differential (∆I ,∆O), we denote by D(∆I ,∆O),r
the set of all the r-round differential trails from ∆I to ∆O.
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Definition 2.2.8. Let (∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆r) ∈ V r+1 be an r-round differential
trail, and let x ∈ V . We say that the pair (x, diff (x,∆0)) follows the differ-
ential trail (∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆r) with respect to Φ
(r) if for each 1 ≤ i ≤ r it holds
diff
(
xE
(i)
K , diff (x+ ∆0)E
(i)
K
)
= ∆i.
A differential trail (∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆r) is hence a sequence of intermediate dif-
ferences at each round, starting and ending respectively at the extremities of
the r-round differential (∆0,∆r). As in the case of differentials, we are inter-
ested in the probability that a given differential trail holds, which is defined
as the probability that a pair follows the differential trail.
Definition 2.2.9. Let (∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆r) ∈ V r+1 be an r-round differential
trail, andK ∈ K be a key of the cipher. Then the probability of the differential
trail (∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆r) with respect to EK is
p(∆0,∆1,...,∆r),K
def
=
#
{
x | x ∈ V, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ r diff
(
xE
(i)
K , diff (x,∆0)E
(i)
K
)
= ∆i
}
#V
.
It should be clear that if a pair (x, diff (x,∆I)) follows an r-round dif-
ferential (∆I ,∆O), then it is uniquely determined an r-round differential
trail (∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆r) such that ∆0 = ∆I , ∆r = ∆O, and the difference of
the partial states at the stage i equals ∆i. Conversely, each pair following
an r−round differential trail (∆I ,∆1, . . . ,∆r−1,∆O) follows the differential
(∆I ,∆O). Hence the following result holds.
Proposition 2.2.10. Let (∆I ,∆O) be an r-round differential. For any en-
cryption function EK, it holds
p
E
(r)
K
∆I
(∆O) =
∑
(∆I ,∆1,...,∆r−1,∆O)
∈D(∆I ,∆O),r
p(∆I ,∆1,...,∆r−1,∆O),K .
The probability of a given r-round differential (∆I ,∆O) with respect to a
fixed key K is then obtained as the sum of the probabilities of all the possible
paths having length r + 1 and going from ∆I to ∆O. However, this result
does not simplify the problem of computing the probability of a differential
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for a fixed key. Indeed, the number of paths from ∆I to ∆O having length
r + 1, #D(∆I ,∆O),r, increases so rapidly with r that it is not possible to list
all of them. Therefore, computing the probability of an r-round differential
trail is still a difficult task, which can be simplified assuming the following
hypothesis.
Definition 2.2.11. An iterated block cipher Φ is called a Markov cipher if
the probability of an output difference of any encryption function, once the
input difference is given, is independent on the chosen message if the keys
are uniformly distributed in the key space.
In such an hypothesis the following result holds.
Proposition 2.2.12. Let us assume that Φ it is a Markov cipher. Then the
probability of an r-round differential trail (∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆r) with respect to the
key K is
p(∆0,∆1,...,∆r),K =
r−1∏
i=0
p
EKi+1
∆i
(∆i+1).
The Markov condition hence allows to calculate the probability of an
r-round differential trail as the product of probabilities for 1-round trails.
Under this assumption, the probability of Proposition 2.2.10, i.e. the proba-
bility of a given r-round differential (∆I ,∆O) for a fixed key, can be seen as
the sum of the probabilities with respect to the fixed key of all the r-round
differential trails from ∆I to ∆O, each of these is the product of 1-round
differential trails. Naturally it is not possible, in general, to verify that the
Markov condition holds. Nevertheless, it is believed that if the key-schedule
is not extremely bad designed, calculating the probability of a differential
by multiplying 1-round differential probabilities gives in general a reasonable
approximation for practical purposes [BS91a]. However, an attacker is not
interested in these key-dependent values in general, since the key used for
the encryption is unknown. The average of this values turns out to be a more
interesting marker.
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Definition 2.2.13. Let (∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆r) ∈ V r+1 be an r-round differential
trail. Then the probability of the differential trail (∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆r) with re-
spect to Φ(r) is
p(∆0,∆1,...,∆r) =
∑
K∈K
p(∆0,∆1,...,∆r),K ·
1
#K .
The following intuitive result links the probability of an r-round differential
with the probability of all the r-round trails which compose the differential.
Theorem 2.2.14. Let (∆I ,∆O) be a differential. Then
pΦ
(r)
∆I
(∆O) =
∑
(∆I ,∆1,...,∆r−1,∆O)
∈Dr,∆I ,∆O
p(∆I ,∆1,...,∆r−1,∆O).
These values are still out of reach for a real-size cipher, therefore nowa-
days the best methods to provide evidence that a given cipher is secure /
insecure with respect to the classical attack are based on the assumption
that it is possible to estimate the best (R − 1)-round differential (∆I ,∆O)
by determining several high-probability (R− 1)-differential trails from ∆I to
∆O.
2.3 The case of SPNs
As already mentioned is the previous chapter, a cipher which belongs to the
family of the SPNs is a set of encryption functions, each of which is the
composition of R round functions. Each of these round functions in turn is
the composition of three different layers: a confusion layer which is public
and XOR-non-linear, a diffusion layer which is public and XOR-linear, and a
key addition layer which acts as a XOR-translation of the round key derived
from the user-selected master key.
In an SPN, if differentials are computed with respect to the XOR, the input
difference to the key-addition layer always equals its output difference, since
for each x, k,∆ ∈ V , (x + k) + (x + ∆ + k) = ∆. This suggests, in the case
of the classical differential attack, to use the XOR as the operation inducing
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the difference operator, hence to consider diff (x, y)
def
= x+ y.
In this context, the following trivial result shows that affine maps admit
deterministic differentials.
Lemma 2.3.1. Let f ∈ AGL(V,+), and let A ∈ GL(V,+) and a ∈ V such
that xf = xA + a for each x ∈ V . Then for each ∆I ∈ V , (∆I ,∆IA) is the
only admissible differential over f . In particular if f ∈ Tn, then p f∆I (∆I) = 1.
Proof. Let ∆I ∈ V , then for each x ∈ V it holds xf + (x+ ∆I)f = xA+ a+
(x+ ∆I)A+ a = xA+ a+ xA+ ∆IA+ a = ∆IA, hence for each ∆ ∈ V
p f∆I (∆) =
1 if ∆ = ∆IA0 if ∆ 6= ∆IA .
In particular, if f is a translation, then A = 1n, hence the desired holds.
Rephrased in the language of SPNs, the previous result means that, when
studying the propagation of differentials through the layers of a SPN, diffu-
sion and key-addition layer have deterministic differentials, hence only the
confusion layer requires a probabilistic analysis.
Corollary 2.3.2. Let Φ be an SPN and let λ be its diffusion layer. To
each input difference ∆ ∈ V to the diffusion layer corresponds the output
difference ∆λ for each x ∈ V . Moreover, to each input difference ∆ to the
key-addition layer corresponds the output difference ∆ for each x ∈ V .
Remark 2.3.3. In the light of the previous result, the probability of any
1-round differential does not depend on the used round-key.
Under the assumption that Φ is a Markov SPN, Proposition 2.2.12 can be
restated. The probability of an r-round differential trail for a given key can
be expressed as the product of key-independent 1-round-trail probabilities.
In particular the probability of an r-round differential trail is independent
on the key used.
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Proposition 2.3.4. Let us assume that Φ is a Markov SPN. Then the prob-
ability of an r-round differential trail (∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆r) with respect to Φ
(r)
is
p(∆0,∆1,...,∆r) =
r−1∏
i=0
p γ∆i(∆i+1λ
−1).
Proof. Let us fix a key K ∈ K. Then
p(∆0,∆1,...,∆r),K =
r−1∏
i=0
p
EKi+1
∆i
(∆i+1)
by virtue of Proposition 2.2.12. The right side of the equation does not
depends of the actual value of the round key derived from the actual K
for Remark 2.3.3. Moveover, from Corollary 2.3.2, each round function of
an SPN sends the input difference ∆I to the output difference ∆O with
probability p if and only if the confusion layer γ sends ∆I to ∆Oλ
−1 with
probability p. Indeed, if this happens, then the diffusion layer sends ∆Oλ
−1
to ∆O with probability 1, and the key-addition layer keeps this difference
unchanged.
Since the confusion layer γ is a parallel map, then the probability of a
1-round differential can be expressed as the product of the probability that
the bricks of the difference pass through the corresponding S-boxes. In this
count, thanks to Remark 2.2.3, S-boxes entered with a zero difference can
be ignored. The latter are important in the context of a differential attack,
therefore they are worth a more formal definition.
Definition 2.3.5. Let (∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆r) be an r-round differential trail. Let
1 ≤ j ≤ b and let 1 ≤ ` ≤ r. The S-box γj is said to be active at the round `
with respect to (∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆r) if ∆`−1pij 6= 0, i.e. if the coordinates of the
j th brick of the input difference at the round (`− 1) is non-zero. If an S-box
is not active, then it is called non-active.
In the following corollary of Proposition 2.3.4, the probability of passing
through a non-active S-boxes is 1.
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Proposition 2.3.6. Let us assume that Φ is a Markov SPN. Then the prob-
ability of an r-round differential trail (∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆r) with respect to Φ
(r)
is
p(∆0,∆1,...,∆r) =
r−1∏
i=0
b∏
j=1
p
γj
∆
[j]
i
(
(∆i+1λ
−1)[j]
)
.
In the light of the previous result, the complexity of computing the prob-
ability of a single trail is significantly reduced. In terms of memory, indeed,
this computation requires storing b matrices with 2s×2s entries, one for each
S-box, containing the data required to predict the output difference after
the S-box, once the input difference is given. It should be clear now that
the number of active S-boxes plays a crucial rule in determining the size of
the probability for a differential trail, and consequently in the success of a
differential attack: the higher this number, the lower the probability that a
given pair follows the differential trail.
Let us recall that in the following three cases the transaction from a
difference to another occurs with probability 1:
• when entering with a zero difference any S-box (entering a non-active
S-box),
• when passing through the diffusion layer,
• when passing through the key-addition layer.
Having noticed this, security from differential cryptanalysis, i.e. guaranteeing
that the probability of each (R− 1)-round differential is low enough that the
cipher cannot be distinguished from a random permutation, is based on the
fact that the differential probabilities induced by the S-boxes (i.e. the only
non-deterministic layers of the cipher in term of difference propagation) are
low. This is mainly possible in two ways:
• the differential probabilities of the S-boxes are low themselves,
• the diffusion layer activates many S-boxes.
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We will discuss these design goals in detail in the following sections, keep-
ing in mind that the success of a differential attack is due to a failure in a
good design of the confusion or of the diffusion layer, or maybe in their poor
interaction.
2.4 Resistance to classical differential crypt-
analysis
The problem of determining conditions on the layers of an SPN guaranteeing
that a given cipher is vulnerable to differential cryptanalysis is difficult. This
is due to the fact that security from differential attacks is based not only on
suitable properties of the layers, but also on the way they interact. In this
section and in the following ones, some of the most used design criteria for
diffusion and confusion layers will be explained. As already mentioned, we
will not focus on any key-schedule-related property, since we will assume that
all the round keys are randomly generated. It is worth to mention though
that also the key-scheduling function may affect, if bad designed, the security
of the cipher in terms of differential attack. However, including such a topic
would lead us out of the scope we have established for this work.
2.4.1 Non-linearity notions for confusion layers
The non-linearity of the confusion layer is a necessary condition for the secu-
rity of the cipher against the most common attacks, and by virtue of Lemma
2.3.1 is particularly crucial in the context of differential attacks. In order
to understand what is a good confusion layer with respect to differential
cryptanalysis, let us assume the most extreme hypothesis: all the encryption
functions are affine. Then in that case, fixing ∆ ∈ V and considering P the
set of pairs having a fixed difference ∆, i.e. P
def
= {(x, x + ∆) | x ∈ V }, after
encrypting all these pairs with an affine function E we obtain
#{x1E + x2E | (x1, x2) ∈ P} = 1.
Stated alternatively, the function ∂∆E : x 7→ xE + (x+ ∆)E in constant on
V . It is clear now that a possible way to measure the non-linearity of E is
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in terms of the number of values that the function ∂∆E assumes, for each
∆ ∈ V . Let us define this in a concrete way.
Definition 2.4.1. Let f : (F2)s → (F2)t be a vectorial Boolean function and
let u ∈ (F2)s. The derivative of f in the direction u, denoted by ∂u f , is the
function
∂u f : (F2)s → (F2)t
x 7→ xf + (x+ u)f.
As already noted, whenever f is linear, the derivatives in every direction are
constant. Hence, the more the derivatives of f are far from being constant,
the more we can assume that f is non-linear. In this sense, the following
definitions can give a first estimate of the non-linearity of f [Nyb93].
Definition 2.4.2. Let f : (F2)s → (F2)t, u ∈ (F2)s and v ∈ (F2)t. Let us
define
δf (u, v)
def
= #{x ∈ (F2)s | x ∂u f = v} = #
{{v}(∂u f)−1} .
The values δf (u, v) previously defined can be stored in a table, which is
important to predict how differences propagate through the S-boxes.
Definition 2.4.3. Let f : (F2)s → (F2)t. The difference distribution table
(DDT) of f is the integer table DDTf ∈ Zs×t where
DDTf [u, v]
def
= δf (u, v).
Example 2.4.4. Figure 2.1 displays the DDT of the 4 × 4 S-box S of the
cipher PRESENT described in Section 1.2.2. As already noticed in Remark
2.2.3, since the considered S-box is invertible, x ∈ (F2)4 is a solution of
xS + (x + ∆)S = 0 if and only if ∆ = 0, hence the first row and the first
column of DDTS are null except for the entry 16 = #(F2)4 corresponding to
the input / output pair (0x, 0x). The remainder of the table reads as follows:
since DDTS[1x, 3x] = 4, it means that the equation xS + (x+ 1x)S = 3x ad-
mits four solutions in (F2)4, hence the probability that the output difference
to S is 3x given that its input difference is 1x is 1/4.
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0x 1x 2x 3x 4x 5x 6x 7x 8x 9x Ax Bx Cx Dx Ex Fx
0x 16 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1x · · · 4 · · · 4 · 4 · · · 4 · ·
2x · · · 2 · 4 2 · · · 2 · 2 2 2 ·
3x · 2 · 2 2 · 4 2 · · 2 2 · · · ·
4x · · · · · 4 2 2 · 2 2 · 2 · 2 ·
5x · 2 · · 2 · · · · 2 2 2 4 2 · ·
6x · · 2 · · · 2 · 2 · · 4 2 · · 4
7x · 4 2 · · · 2 · 2 · · · 2 · · 4
8x · · · 2 · · · 2 · 2 · 4 · 2 · 4
9x · · 2 · 4 · 2 · 2 · · · 2 · 4 ·
Ax · · 2 2 · 4 · · 2 · 2 · · 2 2 ·
Bx · 2 · · 2 · · · 4 2 2 2 · 2 · ·
Cx · · 2 · · 4 · 2 2 2 2 · · · 2 ·
Dx · 2 4 2 2 · · 2 · · 2 2 · · · ·
Ex · · 2 2 · · 2 2 2 2 · · 2 2 · ·
Fx · 4 · · 4 · · · · · · · · · 4 4
Figure 2.1: DDT of the S-box S of PRESENT
The DDT of an S-box is related to its differential probabilities as stated
in the following trivial result. Notice that, for sake of simplicity, differentials
have been defined as pairs of elements in the same set, and their probabil-
ity have been defined only with respect to a bijective function. However
Definition 2.2.2 can be easily generalised to the case of different sets and
non-bijective functions.
Lemma 2.4.5. Let f : (F2)s → (F2)t. Then for any ∆I ∈ (F2)s and ∆O ∈
(F2)t, the probability of the differential (∆I ,∆O) with respect to f is
p f∆I (∆O) =
DDTf [∆I ,∆O]
2s
.
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Notice that, the number of non-zero element in a row DDTf [∆, ·] corre-
sponds to the number of different values that ∂∆f can assume. The following
definition is a way to use these numbers as an indicator for the non-linearity
of f .
Definition 2.4.6. Let f : (F2)s → (F2)t. The differential uniformity of f is
defined as
δ(f)
def
= max
u,v
u6=0
DDTf [u, v],
The function f is said to be δ-differentially uniform if δ = δ(f).
It is straightorward to notice the following properties:
• if x is a solution of xf + (x + ∆I)f = ∆O, also x + ∆I is a solution,
hence DDTf [∆I ,∆O] is always even, and so is δ(f);
• 2 ≤ δ(f) ≤ 2s;
• for each ∆I ∑
∆
DDTf [∆I ,∆] = 2
s.
Since the lower the entries of DDTf [∆I , ·], the more the values ∂∆If assumes,
functions f which reach the lower bound δ(f) = 2 are optimal in terms of
non-linearity, in the sense of preventing difference propagation.
Definition 2.4.7. Let f : (F2)s → (F2)t. If δ(f) = 2, f is called almost-
perfect non-linear (APN).
2.4.2 Known APN permutations
APN functions could represent the best choice when designing the confusion
layer of a cipher. However, the problem of finding APN permutations seems
to be quite hard, specially in some cases which are the most relevant for the
applications. It has been for a long time conjectured that no permutation is
APN if the function has an even number of variables. This conjecture has
been proven false in 2010, when Dillon et al. [BDMW10] showed an example
of an APN permutation in 6 variables. However this is the only known exam-
ple so far of APN permutation taking as input an even number of variables,
31
Resistance to classical differential cryptanalysis
Name Exponent s Conditions Reference
quadratic function 2d
′
+ 1 1 ≤ d′ ≤ ` [Nyb93, Gol68]
gcd(d′, s) = 1
Kasami function 22d
′ − 2d′ + 1 2 ≤ d′ ≤ ` [Kas71]
gcd(d′, s) = 1
Welsh function 2` + 3 [Dob99b, CCD00]
Niho function 2` + 2`/2 − 1 ` even [Dob99a, HX01]
2` + 2(3`+1)/2 − 1 ` odd
inverse function 2s − 2 [Nyb93, BD93]
Table 2.1: Known APN permutations of the type x 7→ xd on (F2)s, s = 2`+1
up to equivalence. It has been shown that no permutation in (F2)s is APN
when s = 4 [BL08, CSV17], and the problem is still open for s ≥ 8.
In the case s odd instead, APN permutations are known. In what follows
we will briefly recall the case of power functions, i.e. (F2)s-valued function
of the type of x 7→ xd, d ∈ N. It is known that an APN power function is a
permutation over (F2)s if and only if s is odd [Car10], hence let us focus on
the case s = 2` + 1. Table 2.1 collects some families of known APN power
functions in odd dimension which are bijective [Blo11].
2.4.3 Other non-linearity notions
In this section we will quickly discuss other non-linearity notions for Boolean
functions. Even if not necessarily related to differential attacks, they will be
used in the remainder of this work. The following definitions were introduced
in [CDVS09b] for the study of group-theoretical properties of ciphers.
The requirement of Definition 2.4.6 is essentially a condition on the pre-
images of the derivatives of f . However, alternative definitions focused on
the images of the derivatives of f may be given. The following one is an
example.
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Definition 2.4.8. Let f : (F2)s → (F2)t, and let δ ≥ 2. Then f is called
weakly δ-differentially uniform if δ is the least integer such that for each
u ∈ (F2)s \ {0} it holds
# Im(∂uf) >
2 s−1
δ
.
The adjective weak is justified by the following result [CDVS09b].
Proposition 2.4.9. Let f : (F2)s → (F2)t, and let δ ≥ 2. If f is δ-
differentially uniform, then f is weakly δ-differentially uniform.
Proof. Let u ∈ (F2)s, u 6= 0. From the definition of δ-differential uniformity
follows that for v ∈ (F2)t it holds #v(∂uf)−1 ≤ δ. Moreover
(F2)s =
⋃
v∈Im(∂uf)
v(∂uf)
−1,
and from the hypothesis it follows
2s = #
 ⋃
v∈Im(∂uf)
v(∂uf)
−1
 ≤ # Im(∂uf)δ.
Therefore
# Im(∂uf) ≥ 2
s
δ
>
2s
δ
.
Another useful notion of non-linearity comes from the following consid-
eration. Let f ∈ Sym(F2)s be such that 0f = 0. If f is linear, every vecto-
rial subspace of (F2)s is sent to a subspace of (F2)s of the same dimension,
i.e. the dimension of subspace is invariant under f . When f is not linear,
the null space is mapped into itself, every 1-dimensional subspace {0, a} is
mapped into the 1-dimensional subspace {0, af}, whereas the 2-dimensional
subspace {0, a, b, a+ b} is mapped into a 2-dimensional subspace if an only if
af + bf = (a+ b)f . It should be clear that the bigger the dimension l < s of
the subspace, the more unlikely the image of the subspace under f is still a
vector subspace. The following definition [CDVS09b] is given in this sense.
Definition 2.4.10. Let f ∈ Sym(F2)s be such that 0f = 0 and let 0 < δ < s.
The function f is said to be δ-non-invariant if for any subspaces U, V ≤ (F2)s
such that Uf = V either U = V = (F2)s or dim(U) = dim(V ) < s− δ.
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Being δ-non-invariant then means that the largest proper subspace sent
by f into another subspace has co-dimension greater than δ.
Example 2.4.11. As an example, let us consider the so-called patched in-
version f ∈ Sym (F28), which maps every non-zero element into its multi-
plicative inverse. It is well known that a function which is equivalent to f , up
to a change of variable, is used as S-box in the AES. The patched inversion
is 4-differentially uniform on F28 [Nyb93], whereas it is known that, for each
u ∈ F28 , u 6= 0, it holds # Im(∂uf) = 27 − 1 > 26, hence f is weakly 2-
differentially uniform. On the other hand, it has been proven in [CDVS09b]
that f is 1-non-invariant.
2.4.4 Requirements on the diffusion layer
As we have discussed in previous sections, the confusion layer of an iterated
cipher, due mainly to efficiency reasons, is a local non-linear transformation,
i.e. any output bit depends on only a limited number of input bits. In
particular, it does not provide any interaction between the different bricks.
This role is played by the diffusion layer that, acting over all the bricks of
the block, spreads the information of a single bit also to bricks different to
the one the bit belongs to. In our setting, diffusion is always realised by
means of a linear map on V . The following definitions were given as minimal
requirement for diffusion in [CDVS09b], in the case of a bijective layer, and
were used to derive group-theoretical results on SPNs.
Let us recall that V = V1 ⊕ V2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ Vb, and that each s-dimensional
space Vj is called a brick.
Definition 2.4.12. A wall V ′ of V is a non-trivial and proper sum of bricks
of V , i.e. there exists ∅ 6= J ( {1, 2, . . . , b} such that V ′ = ⊕j∈JVj.
We say that a diffusion layer λ is proper if no wall of V is invariant under
λ, and that λ is strongly proper if no wall of V is mapped by λ into another
wall of V .
Definition 2.4.13. A linear transformation λ ∈ Sym(V ) is a proper diffusion
layer if for any wall V ′ =
⊕
j∈J Vj of V it holds V
′λ 6= V ′.
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Definition 2.4.14. A linear transformation λ ∈ Sym(V ) is a strongly proper
diffusion layer if for any ∅ 6= J1, J2 ( {1, 2, . . . , b} such that #J1 = #J2 it
holds (⊕
j∈J1
Vj
)
λ 6=
⊕
j∈J2
Vj.
It is clear that the condition in Definition 2.4.14 implies the one in Defi-
nition 2.4.13.
On the other hand, with an eye on the security with respect differential
attacks, following the approach of [DR13], the diffusion can be estimated in
terms of a lower bound on the number of the active S-box of any 1-round
differential trail (see Definition 2.2.7).
Definition 2.4.15. Let x ∈ V , x = (x[1], x[2], . . . , x[b]), with x[j] ∈ (F2)s
being the jth brick, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ b. The brick weight of x is defined as
weightb(x)
def
=
∑
x[j] 6=0
1.
Let now consider an iterated cipher Φ whose generating function is ρ =
γλ. Notice that, if (∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆r) is an r-round differential trail, the num-
ber of active S-boxes at the round ` with respect to (∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆r), defined
in Definition 2.3.5, is exactly weightb (∆`−1). In the context of evaluating
the diffusion properties of λ with respect to differential cryptanalysis, a con-
siderable measure is the minimum number of active bricks at the input and
output of ρ, called the branch number of λ, which basically provides a lower
bound for the minimum brick weight of any 1-round differential trail. To
formalise this, we need the following definition [DR13].
Definition 2.4.16. Let λ ∈ Sym(V ). The branch number of λ is defined as
min
x,y∈V
x 6=y
{weightb(x+ y) + weightb(xλ+ yλ)} .
The branch number always ranges between 2 and b + 1, and diffusion
layers whose branch number equals b+ 1, also called perfect diffusion layers,
can be constructed from MDS codes [DR13]. Intuitively, provided that the
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diffusion layer is (at least) proper, the larger the branch number, the less the
number of rounds the encryption needs to be iterated. On the other hand,
the counterpart for this is that layers with a larger branch number have
higher implementation costs. As an illustration for this, let us recall that
the proper diffusion layer of AES has branch number equal to five, and the
cipher, in its version with a 128-bit key, performs a 10-round encryption. On
the other hand, the permutation matrix of PRESENT has branch number
equal to two, due to the fact that, for example, the vector (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) is
fixed. The encryption in this case is iterated for 31 round. The following
theorem, due to Daemen and Rijmen [DR13], relates the branch number of
λ to a bound on the number of active S-boxes in a differential trail.
Theorem 2.4.17. Let Φ be an iterated block cipher having generating func-
tion ρ = γλ. Then the number of active S-boxes in any 1-round differential
trail is lower bounded by the branch number of λ.
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3.1 Algebraic security
Besides statistical attacks, also algebraic attacks might represent serious
threats for block ciphers, as we elaborate further in the following chapters.
It is possible, indeed, to link some algebraic properties of the generating
function and some algebraic weaknesses of the corresponding cipher. In par-
ticular, in this work we will focus on group-theoretical attacks, which have
attracted the attention of some mathematicians and cryptographers in the
last forty years. The pioneers of the study of ciphers from a group-theoretical
point of view were Coppersmith and Grossman, which in 1975 considered a
set of functions which can be used to define a block cipher and, by studying
the permutation group generated by those, opened the way to a new branch
of research focused on group-theoretical properties which can reveal weak-
nesses of the cipher itself [CG75]. As it has been proved later in [KRS03], if
the group generated by the encryption functions is too small, then the cipher
is vulnerable to birthday-paradox attacks. Recently, in [CS17] the authors
proved that if such group is contained in an isomorphic image of the affine
group of the message space induced by a hidden sum, then it is possible
to embed a dangerous trapdoor on it. More relevant in [Pat99], Paterson
built a DES-like cipher whose encryption functions generate an imprimitive
group and showed how the knowledge of this trapdoor can be turned into
an efficient attack to the cipher. For this reason, a branch of research in
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symmetric cryptography is focused on showing that the group generated by
the encryption functions of a given cipher is primitive and not of affine type
[ACTT16, ACDVS14, ACS17, CDVS09a, CDVS09b, SW08, Wer92, Wer02,
Wer10].
The definition of the group under consideration presents some issues,
which we discuss in the following section.
3.2 The group generated by the round func-
tions
As already explained in Section 3.1, statistical attacks are just some of the
issues that can threaten block ciphers. Several researchers have shown in
recent years that also algebraic attacks can be effective. In this work, the fo-
cus is on a particular group-theoretical attack, described in [Pat99] and here
treated in Section 3.3, based on an undesirable property of the permutation
group generated by the round functions of a cipher, the imprimitivity.
Let us define now the target of the so-called imprimitivity attack: the
group generated by the round functions of the cipher.
Let Φ = {EK | K ∈ K} ⊆ Sym(M) be an R-round iterated block cipher.
We have stressed that the group generated by all encryption functions
Γ(Φ)
def
= 〈EK | K ∈ K〉 ≤ Sym(M)
can reveal weaknesses of the cipher. However, since Γ(Φ) is strictly related
to the key-scheduling procedure, which is not easy to describe in terms of
groups and their action, its algebraic study is not an easy task. For this
reason researchers classically focus on a group which is related to Γ(Φ) and
which, ignoring the effect of the key-schedule, is easier to study (for a recent
example of a key-schedule related study, see [BF17]). The latter can be
defined as follows: since each permutation EK is the composition of R round
functions ε1,K , ε2,K . . . , εR,K , for each 1 ≤ r ≤ R, it is possible to define the
group
Γr(Φ)
def
= 〈εr,K | K ∈ K〉,
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where all the possible round keys for the round r are considered. This lead
to the definition of the group
Γ∞(Φ)
def
= 〈Γr(Φ) | 1 ≤ r ≤ R〉,
which is called the group generated by the round functions of Φ, and trivially
contains the group generated by the encryption functions as a subgroup.
Example 3.2.1. Let us denote by Φ the block cipher PRESENT defined in
Section 1.2.2. As already mentioned, the problem of describing the group
Γ(Φ) is out of reach today. However, being ρ the generating function of
PRESENT, i.e. the composition of its confusion and diffusion layers, one can
easily prove that the group generated by the rounds of the cipher is Γ∞(Φ) =
〈ρ, T64〉. Indeed, the left-to-right inclusion is trivial due to the definition of
round function. On the other hand, when the null key is considered, we
obtain ρ ∈ Γ∞, hence also ρ−1 ∈ Γ∞, and consequently T64 < Γ∞. This
proves the right-to-left inclusion. The same description holds for a large class
of ciphers, called translation-based ciphers [CDVS09b], which also includes
the block ciphers AES and SERPENT and some lightweight ciphers.
3.3 Imprimitivity attack
Before describing the imprimitivity attack, let us recall some basic notions
from permutation group theory. Let G be a finite group acting on the
set M. We denote by vG = {vg | g ∈ G} the orbit of v ∈ M and by
Gv = {g ∈ G | vg = v} its stabiliser. A partition X of M is trivial if
X = {M} or X = {{v} | v ∈ M}, and G-invariant if for any X ∈ X and
g ∈ G it holds Xg ∈ X . Any non-trivial and G-invariant partition X of M
is called a block system. In particular any X ∈ X is called an imprimitivity
block. The group G is primitive in its action onM (or G acts primitively on
M) if G is transitive and there exists no block system. Otherwise, the group
G is imprimitive in its action on M (or G acts imprimitively on M).
We remind the following well-known results which will be useful in the
remainder of the work, and whose proofs may be found e.g. in [Cam99].
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Lemma 3.3.1. A block of imprimitivity is the orbit vH of a proper subgroup
H < G that properly contains the stabiliser Gv, for some v ∈M.
Lemma 3.3.2. If T is a transitive subgroup of G, then a block system for G
is also a block system for T .
Lemma 3.3.3. Let us assume that M is a finite vector space over F2 and
T its translation group, i.e. T = {σv | σv : M →M, x 7→ x + v, v ∈ M}.
Then
• T is 2-elementary, abelian and regular;
• T is transitive and imprimitive on M;
• for any proper and non-trivial subgroup U of (M,+), {U +v | v ∈M}
is a block system.
Description of the imprimitivity attack
When the group Γ∞(Φ) turns out to act imprimitively onM, then it is pos-
sible to individuate a non-trivial partition X of M which is invariant under
the action of Γ∞(Φ). Then an attacker can proceed as follows:
Preprocessing
• he chooses a random message (blue dots in Figure 3.1) in each imprim-
itivity block and encrypts it using a target encryption function EK ,
depending on the unknown key K ∈ K;
• for each selected message, he individuates which block its corresponding
ciphertext (red dots in Figure 3.1) belongs to.
Doing so, the attacker obtains a description of the way the target function
maps blocks into blocks (see Figure 3.1) by computing |X | encryptions.
Then the attacker, which has been given a target encrypted message y
(red dot in Figure 3.2), performs the following:
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Figure 3.1: Preprocessing of the imprimitivity attack
Figure 3.2: Imprimitivity attack
Attack
• he determines which block X ′ the target encrypted message belongs to;
• he individuates the corresponding imprimitivity block under the action
of EK , i.e. the block X such that XEK = X
′ (blue box in Figure 3.2);
• he searches by brute-force for all the meaningful messages in X.
It is now clear that the imprimitivity of the group allows to perform an attack
which requires much less than the |M| operations of a brute-force attack. For
this reason, it represents a serious flaw for the cipher Φ, and the primitivity
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of Γ∞(Φ) is a design goal. An example of a successful attack on a DES-like
cipher which makes use of this technique may be found e.g. in [Pat99].
3.4 Resistance to imprimitivity attack
In this section we provide some necessary conditions for the generating func-
tion of a cipher which make the group Γ∞ a primitive group. We will use
here the alternative definitions of non-linearity explained in Section 2.4.3.
The following result, proved in [CDVS09b] is valid for SPNs.
Theorem 3.4.1. Let Φ be an R-round SPN, and let ρ = γλ its generating
function. If λ is proper and there exists 1 ≤ δ < s such that for each
1 ≤ j ≤ b the S-box γj is
• weakly 2δ-differentially uniform,
• δ-non-invariant,
then Γ∞(Φ)) is primitive.
Equivalently, it has been proven in [ACTT16] that the second condition of
Theorem 3.4.1 can be weakened as long as the standard notion of differential
uniformity is used in the place of the weak one.
Theorem 3.4.2. Let Φ be an R-round SPN, and let ρ = γλ its generating
function. If λ is proper and there exists 1 ≤ δ < s such that for each
1 ≤ j ≤ b the S-box γj is
• 2δ-differentially uniform,
• (δ − 1)-non-invariant,
then Γ∞(Φ)) is primitive.
To conclude this introduction to group-theoretical security of block ci-
phers, we list in Table 3.1 all the results concerning the primitivity of estab-
lished block ciphers and the corresponding references.
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Cipher Γ∞ Reference
DES [Pub77] Alt(V ) [Wer92]
SERPENT [BAK98] Alt(V ) [Wer02]
AES [DR13] Alt(V ) [Wer10]
KASUMI [Spe07] Alt(V ) [SW15]
GOST-like [Dol10] Alt(V ) [ACS17]
PRESENT [BKL+07] Alt(V ) [ACTT16]
RECTANGLE [ZBL+15] Alt(V ) [ACTT16]
PRINTcipher [KLPR10] Alt(V ) [ACTT16]
Table 3.1: Ciphers whose group generated by the round functions is primi-
tive
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Differential cryptanalysis using
alternative operations
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4Alternative operations forcryptanalysis
In this part of the thesis the following problem is addressed: is it possible
that a block cipher apparently immune to classical differential cryptanalysis
can be attacked considering a different operation on the message space?
4.1 Overview and motivation
Differential cryptanalysis was introduced in the beginning of the 90’s [BS91a]
as a powerful statistical attack targeting first the block cipher DES and has
been already described in Chapter 2. The attack, which has later been gen-
eralised [Knu94b, BBS99, Knu98], takes advantage of non-uniform relations
between plaintext and corresponding ciphertext pairs. Designing ciphers
resistant to this attack and its generalisations has since then be of outstand-
ing importance. While, to follow the structure of many symmetric crypto-
graphic designs, the classical difference considered is the bit-wise addition
modulo two, in [Ber92] Berson introduces the modular difference to study
the MD/SHA family of hash functions. In [AS11], the authors try to use a
similar method to cryptanalyse the block cipher PRESENT [BKL+07], fea-
turing a bit-wise round-key addition. Even though this attempt has been
unsuccessful, the idea of using alternative difference operations is for the
first time taken into consideration and used in block ciphers with a bit-wise
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key addition.
The aim of this work is to show that block ciphers may have different
levels of resistance against differential attacks, depending on the additive
law that is considered on the message space. Even if it is not essential, all
the theory is developed on SPN-like ciphers.
Design principles
While bit-wise and modular differences have always been good natural can-
didates following the cipher’s structure, in this work we investigate the pos-
sibility of using other differences. The aim being, then, to determine some
operations which can weaken the security of well known ciphers. While given
a message set of 2n elements, the number of possible operations on this set is
huge, in this work we propose a particular set of difference possibly threat-
ening the security of key-alternating SPN block ciphers. Among the studied
criteria to define suitable operations, we focus on operations which can be
implemented relatively easily when defined over the basis elements. Such
operations, defined from elementary abelian regular groups of translations,
have been studied in the recent papers [CS17, BCS17]. In particular, to the
best of our knowledge, the first time such operations were described and em-
ployed for cryptographic purposes was in [CS17], where the authors provided
a description of a family of operations which are particularly suitable for im-
plementation, and designed a toy cipher whose encryption functions are linear
with respect to an alternative operation, which they called a hidden sum. In
this part of the thesis instead, similar operations are studied in the differen-
tial context. Constraints coming from the combination of the bit-wise key
addition with these operations are studied, and the notion of key distribution
table is introduced. The differential uniformity, with respect to other opera-
tions, of some non-linear permutations such as the classical cubic function is
studied. In particular we provide some conditions increasing the differential
uniformity of this function. As a second contribution we propose an example
of an SPN block cipher which is resistant against the classical differential
attack, with XOR differences, but it is not resistant against a differential
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attack which makes use of alternative differences coming from another oper-
ation defined on the message space. The designed experimental 15-bit block
cipher possesses a structure similar to the one of PRINTcipher [KLPR10],
with 3-bit S-boxes affine equivalent to the cubic function. The used linear
layer is compatible with the chosen alternative difference and is described
by a 15 × 15 matrix which presents some similarities with the permutation
matrices of the block cipher PRINCE [BCG+12]. A general structure for po-
tentially good diffusion layer is provided in this work, reducing the search for
candidates round function which would weaken the security of SPNs when
comparing our difference operation and the classical one.
Once showed how to define new operations ◦ on the message space, suf-
ficient conditions for ◦-difference propagation during the encryption process
are investigated. Based on the different component of SPN ciphers we search
for operations satisfying the following properties.
parallel confusion layer Although the operation ◦ might be a priori de-
fined on the whole message space V, studying differential properties of
a confusion layer seen as a function with 2n inputs may be impracti-
cal for standard-size ciphers. For this reason, in this work we choose
to focus on operations which are applied in parallel to the different
bricks, i.e. ◦ = (◦(1), ◦(2), . . . , ◦(b)), where for each 1 ≤ j ≤ b, ◦(j) is an
operation on (F2)s. This allows us to independently study each S-box.
linear diffusion layer To limit the impact on the ◦-differential probability
of a ◦-differential trail, we analyse only operations such that the diffu-
sion layer is linear with respect to both + and ◦. Indeed, if this is the
case, the diffusion layer requires no probabilistic analysis.
However, as the chosen operation is different from the XOR, used to add the
key at the different rounds of the cipher, differential probabilities have to
be introduced when studying the interaction between ◦-differences and the
key-addition layer. We show how to define a class of operations such that
◦-differences resulting from the key-addition layer do not depend on the state
considered. In particular, we prove that (x+ k) ◦ ((x ◦∆) + k) equals ∆ for
a subset of keys and does not depend on x for all keys. In this and in the
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following chapter we explain how these requirements can be met.
The theory of alternative operations for cryptographic purposes has been
developed in [CS17] and later in [BCS17], from which this work has drawn
inspiration. Part of this description includes contents of [CS17, BCS17,
CDVS06], sometimes stated and proved differently, according to the termi-
nology and the notation of differential cryptanalysis.
4.2 Differential cryptanalysis revised
When developing new SPNs, designers provide hints on the immunity of the
proposed cipher from standard statistical attacks, among which they cer-
tainly include differential cryptanalysis. Even if an exhaustive search for
high-probability differentials cannot be performed, they usually provide an
esteem of the probabilities of the best trails, assuming that these values can
accurately measure the resistance to differential attacks. This is classically
done with respect to the difference operator diff (x, y) = x + y, since this
makes deterministic the output difference of the key addition layer. Then,
once we are given an R-round SPN designed to be secure against differential
attacks, we can assume that no difference propagates during the encryption
process with a probability high enough to allow a distinguisher attack. In
other words, we believe that for each r-round differential (∆I ,∆O), when
r ∼ R, it holds p∆I (∆O) ∼ 2−n. However, the fact that the key-addition
is XOR-based does not force an attacker to use the XOR as the operation
defining differentials. As a matter of fact, nothing guarantees that the differ-
ential probabilities computed with respect to the XOR are higher than those
computed with respect to different operations, and hence that the security
from XOR-based differential attacks implies the immunity from differential
attacks induced by whatever difference operator. Our goal is to introduce
another group operation, denoted with a circle, ◦ on the message space and
to show that an SPN secure in the classical sense can be distinguished from
a random permutation using the new operation considered.
Let ◦ be an additive group operation on V such that x ◦ x = 0 for each
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x ∈ V , different from the XOR. We aim at investigating whether it is possible
to perform a distinguishing attack against the cipher, where all the chosen
plaintext pairs are of the type (x, diff (x,∆)) for a given ∆ ∈ V , and where
the difference operator diff (x, y) = x ◦ y is different from the one induced
by the XOR. Since through all this chapter we will have to deal with differ-
entials, differential probabilities, differential trails etc. which are computed
with respect to different operations, we will denote the dependence on the
operation by adding a prefix “+-” if the differential is induced by the XOR
and “◦-” if the differential is induced by an operation circle.
In the remainder of this second part, we will explain in detail how to
build new additive laws on V and how to study the interaction between the
induced differentials and the layers of an SPN. We will provide a concrete ex-
ample of cipher whose +-differential probabilities do not lead to a successful
distinguishing attack, i.e. a cipher which is secure from differential crypt-
analysis in the standard context, but against which a differential attack can
be successfully performed by computing ◦-diffentials, where ◦ is an operation
tailored to fit the structure of the chosen SPN.
4.3 New operations on the message space
Let us recall that we denote by T+ the group of translations on V , i.e.
T+ = {σa | a ∈ V, x 7→ x+ a} ,
and let us stress again that the translation σk acts on a vector x in the same
way the key addition layer acts on the message x, i.e. xσk = x + k. In
order to represent the key addition by means of an action of the translation
group on the message space, let us recall that T+ is 2-elementary, abelian
and regular (see Lemma 3.3.3). Moreover, the operation + on V can be seen
as the action of T+ on V , i.e.
∀a, b ∈ V a+ b = aσb.
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Our goal is to define alternative operations on the vector space V by means
of other 2-elementary abelian regular groups which can play the role of
translation groups. Indeed, given any 2-elementary abelian regular subgroup
T < Sym(V ), we can represent T = {τa | a ∈ V }, where for a given a ∈ V ,
τa is the unique element in T which maps 0 into a. Then, if we define
∀a, b ∈ V a ◦ b def= aτb,
we obtain that (V, ◦) is an additive group and ◦ induces a vector space
structure on V , whose corresponding group of translations is T◦ = T . The
proof of this fact is straightforward. Indeed, given a, b, c ∈ V the following
conditions hold.
• ◦ is abelian: a ◦ b = aτb = 0τaτb = 0τbτa = bτa = b ◦ a;
• 0 is the neutral element with respect to ◦: 0 ◦ a = 0τa = a;
• a is the inverse of a: a ◦ a = aτa = 0(τa)2 = 0;
• ◦ is associative:
(a ◦ b) ◦ c = aτbτc = 0τaτbτc = 0τbτcτa = (b ◦ c) ◦ a = a ◦ (b ◦ c).
Moreover, (V, ◦) is a vector space over F2, which is isomorphic to (V,+). How-
ever, this construction is too general and far from being practically usable.
Indeed, even assuming that we are given a basis of (V, ◦) and a procedure to
compute the coefficient of each vector in the given basis, the computation of
a ◦ b for each a, b ∈ V requires at least the storage of the n × 2n values of
the translations defining the basis. For this reason, let us define a class of
operations for which a ◦ b can be computed in polynomial time.
4.3.1 Efficiently-computable new operations
Alternative operations can be defined by means of elementary abelian regular
subgroups of permutations. However, this hypothesis is too general to be use-
ful in practice, since the computation of a◦b for each a, b ∈ V requires at least
the storage of n 2n-valued functions. For this reason it becomes necessary to
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individuate a smaller subgroup of Sym(V ) which contains elementary abelian
regular groups inducing operations that are efficiently computable. In this
section we develop the procedure which led us to select some particular set
of alternative operations. In particular, based on the result, firstly showed
in [CS17], that operations defined from elementary abelian and regular sub-
groups T◦ < AGL(V,+) can be easily computed, we focus on such groups
and show a practical method to construct the corresponding operations.
Setting 1. The operation ◦ is induced by a translation group T◦ which is
elementary, abelian and regular, and such that T◦ < AGL(V,+).
Les us assume that T◦ < AGL(V,+) is elementary, abelian and regular,
and let ◦ be the corresponding operation induced. Then, given a ∈ V , the
translation τa is an affine map with respect to +, which means that there
exists a +-linear map (i.e. a matrix) Ma depending on a, and a +-translation
σb for some b ∈ V such that τa = Maσb. In addition, since 0τa = a, we obtain
b = a and so
∀a ∈ V ∃Ma ∈ GL(V,+) τa = Maσa.
In the light of this, in what follows we will denote with Ma the matrix defining
τa. The following result shows how + interacts with an operation ◦ induced
by an elementary abelian regular subgroup of the affine group. In particular,
it shows that ◦ is not distributive over +.
Proposition 4.3.1. Let T◦ < AGL(V,+) an elementary abelian regular
group. For each a, b, c ∈ V it holds
(a+ b) ◦ c = a ◦ c+ b ◦ c+ c.
Proof. Let a, b, c ∈ V . Then
(a+ b) ◦ c = (a+ b)Mc + c
= (aMc + c) + (bMc + c) + c
= a ◦ c+ b ◦ c+ c,
hence the statement is proven.
This result has, as a consequence, that a◦b can be computed in polynomial
time.
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Corollary 4.3.2. For each a, b ∈ V , if a = ∑ni=1 ξiei, with ξi ∈ F2, it holds
a ◦ b =

∑
ξi 6=0 b ◦ ei if weight(a) is odd,(∑
ξi 6=0 b ◦ ei
)
+ b if weight(a) is even.
Proof. Let a, b, c, d ∈ V . Using Proposition 4.3.1 we obtain
(a+ b+ c) ◦ d = a ◦ d+ (b+ c) ◦ d+ d
= a ◦ d+ b ◦ d+ c ◦ d+ d+ d
= a ◦ b+ b ◦ d+ c ◦ d.
Using this fact and the result of Proposition 4.3.1, the proof of the corollary
is straightforward.
Proposition 4.3.3. Let T◦ be as in Setting 1. The map a 7→ Ma is an
homorphism between (V, ◦) and GL(V,+) equipped with the matrix multipli-
cation.
Proof. Let a, b, x ∈ V . It holds
x ◦ (a ◦ b) = xMa◦b + (a ◦ b)
= xMa◦b + aMb + b
and
(x ◦ a) ◦ b = (xMa + a) ◦ b
= (xMa + a)Mb + b
= xMaMb + aMb + b.
Being ◦ associative, the desired result is proven.
Corollary 4.3.4. The set {Ma | a ∈ V } is a commutative subgroup of
GL(V,+) and every element has order 2.
Example 4.3.5. Let us show an operation which is built from a 2-elementary
abelian and regular subgroup of AGL(V,+), which is different from the XOR.
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Let us assume n = 3, hence V = (F2)3. In order to describe the operation,
let us show all the matrices Ma, with a ∈ V :
M0x =
1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
M1x =
0 1 11 0 1
0 0 1
M2x =
0 1 10 1 0
1 1 0
M3x =
1 0 01 0 1
1 1 0

M4x =
1 0 01 0 1
1 1 0
M5x =
0 1 10 1 0
1 1 0
M6x =
0 1 11 0 1
0 0 1
M7x =
1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
 .
It is an easy (but tedious) task to verify that
{1x, 2x, 6x} = {(0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0), (1, 1, 0)}
is a basis for (V, ◦). However, on the other hand
e1 ◦ e2 = (0, 0, 1) ◦ (0, 1, 0)
= (0, 0, 1)M2x + (0, 1, 0)
= (0, 0, 1)
0 1 10 1 0
1 1 0
+ (0, 1, 0)
= (1, 1, 0) + (0, 1, 0)
= (1, 0, 0)
= e3,
therefore the canonical basis is not a basis for (V, ◦).
As we have just shown, we do not have a “canonical” basis for (V, ◦) in
general. This does not represent a major issue since, by means of Corol-
lary 4.3.2, we can always compute a ◦ b by moving the problem in (V,+),
where we always know a basis. However, in the following sections, we will
refine the hypotheses on T◦ in order to obtain operations which are suitable
for performing a differential attack against an SPN, and simultaneously we
will determine conditions which ensure that the canonical basis is always a
basis for (V, ◦).
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4.4 Interaction with the key-addition layer
Let now ◦ be an operation as in Setting 1 and let us assume we want to
use it for a differential attack. The classical differential attack exploits the
property, as well as others, that each +-difference is maintained the same
after the round key is XORed. This is never the case when considering ◦-
differences. Indeed, for each pair of messages x and x◦∆ having ◦-difference
fixed to ∆, after the addition with the round key k we get
(x+ k) ◦ ((x ◦∆) + k). (4.1)
It is easy to show that Eq. (4.1) = ∆ for each x, k ∈ V if and only if + = ◦.
However, it may be possible that for some weak key k ∈ V it holds x+k = x◦k
for each x ∈ V . Then, in that case, every occurrence of “+k” in Eq. (4.1)
can be replaced by “◦k”, and hence the output difference to the key-addition
layer becomes (x ◦ k) ◦ ((x ◦ ∆) ◦ k) = ∆, which is exactly what happens
in the classical attack when differences pass through the key-addition layer.
Let us give a formal definition of the (possibly empty) set of weak keys.
Definition 4.4.1. Let ◦ be any operation on V . A vector k ∈ V is called a
weak key if for each x ∈ V it holds x+ k = x ◦ k. The set
W◦
def
= {k | k ∈ V, k is a weak key}
is called the set of the weak keys.
In this context, the following result is helpful. The proof may be found
in [CDVS06].
Theorem 4.4.2. Let T◦ be as in Setting 1. Then T◦ ∩ T+ 6= ∅.
As a consequence of this theorem, if the translations defining ◦ are +-
affinities, then weak keys exist. The proof for this fact relies on the following
lemma.
Lemma 4.4.3. Let T◦ be as in Setting 1. For each a ∈ V , σa ∈ T◦ if and
only if a ∈ W◦.
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Proof. Let a ∈ V . If σa ∈ T◦, there exists b ∈ V such that σa = τb, and
a = 0σa = 0τb = b, hence σa = τa. This proves a ∈ W◦. Conversely, if
a ∈ W◦, then σa = τa ∈ T◦.
Theorem 4.4.4. Let T◦ be as in Setting 1. Then W◦ is a non-trivial vector
subspace of (V,+) and (V, ◦).
Proof. Let a ∈ V . From Theorem 4.4.2 and from Lemma 4.4.3
∅ 6= {a | a ∈ V, σa ∈ T◦ ∩ T+} = W◦,
which concludes the proof.
The following result gives a bound on the dimension of the weak-key
space, and it is due to Calderini [CS17].
Theorem 4.4.5. Let T◦ be as in Setting 1 and let us assume T◦ 6= T+. Then
0 < dim(W◦) ≤ n− 2.
Proof. Let us assume by contradiction that W◦ = Span{a1, a2, . . . , an−1},
and let a in V \W◦. Let b ∈ V and let us write b =
∑n−1
i=1 ξiai + ξna, where
ξi ∈ F2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let us recall that, since for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 it holds
ai + a = ai ◦ a = aiMa + a, then ai = aiMa. Furthermore a ◦ a = 0, hence
aMa = a. Therefore
b ◦ a =
(
n−1∑
i=1
ξiai + ξna
)
◦ a
=
(
n−1∑
i=1
ξiai + ξna
)
Ma + a
=
n−1∑
i=1
ξiaiMa + ξnaMa + a
=
n−1∑
i=1
ξiai + ξna+ a
= b+ a.
This proves that a ∈ W◦, which is a contradiction.
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Example 4.4.6. Let us recall the operation defined in Example 4.3.5. In
the light of the previous result, for this operation the weak-key subspace is
1-dimensional. The non-trivial weak key for ◦ is (1, 1, 1), as it can be noticed
from M7x = 13, which means that W◦ = {(0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1)}.
The important role of W◦ is now disclosed: whenever k is a weak key,
the key-addition layer σk behaves as a translation layer with respect to ◦-
differences. However, in the general case, when k is not a weak key, the
value of Eq. (4.1) is different from ∆, hence differential probabilities have
to be introduced when studying the interaction between ◦-differences and
the key-addition layer. With an eye on using ◦ to perform a differential
attack, we can reasonably assert that the attack can succeed if we manage to
weaken enough the non-linearity of the confusion layer. It is straightforward
to notice that the larger the set of the weak keys, the more the operation
◦ is similar to +. For this reason we may be tempted to assume that a
successful attack relies on considering an operation ◦ such that dim(W◦) is
very little compared to n. On the other hand, for such an operation, the
probabilities induced by the key-addition layer are lower that those induced
by an operation with a larger weak-key set, since it happens more often that
the output difference of the key-addition layer depends on the message and
on the key, as well as on the input difference. The success of a differential
attack using a different operation relies then, among other things, on finding
the correct balance between n and dim(W◦). In order to understand that,
we need a more practical way to represent the matrices described in Section
4.3.1, which will be explained in Section 4.4.2. Before doing this, let us define
a further operation which simplifies computations involving ◦ and +.
4.4.1 Introducing a product
Let us recall that the operation ◦, as shown in Proposition 4.3.1, is not
distributive over +. Since our goal is to determine the value of Eq. (4.1),
let us introduce an operation on V which is induced by both + and ◦ and
helps in understanding their interaction. Although the following operation
depends on ◦, we do not explicitly write its dependance to keep the notation
lighter.
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Definition 4.4.7. Let ◦ be an operation as in Setting 1. For each a, b ∈ V
let us define
a · b def= a+ b+ a ◦ b.
The operation · is called the dot product induced by ◦.
Remark 4.4.8. The following facts are straightforward:
• the dot product · is abelian,
• for each a ∈ V , a · a = 0,
• if a ∈ W◦ or b ∈ W◦, then a · b = 0. In particular for each a ∈ V ,
a · 0 = 0.
The importance of the dot product is established by the following result,
whose straightforward proof which follows is intended to show in an easy way
to the reader how all the previously defined operations combine together.
Theorem 4.4.9. Let ◦ be an operation as in Setting 1 and let · be the dot
product induced. Then · is distributive over +, i.e. (V,+, ·) is an F2-algebra.
Proof. Let a, b, c ∈ V . First of all · is associative. Indeed
(a · b) · c = (a+ b+ a ◦ b) · c
= a+ b+ a ◦ b+ c+ (a+ b+ a ◦ b) ◦ c
= a+ b+ c+ a ◦ b+ a ◦ c+ b ◦ c+ a ◦ b ◦ c
= a+ b+ c+ b ◦ c+ a ◦ (b+ c+ b ◦ c)
= a · (b+ c+ b ◦ c)
= a · (b · c).
Moreover,
(a+ b) · c = a+ b+ c+ (a+ b) ◦ c
= a+ b+ c+ a ◦ c+ b ◦ c+ c
= a+ c+ a ◦ c+ b+ c+ b ◦ c
= a · c+ b · c,
hence · is distributive over + and therefore (V,+, ·) is an F2-algebra.
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Now that the dot product has been introduced, we can rewrite Eq. (4.1)
in a different way. This will lead to the definition of new hypotheses on T◦
which will make the operation ◦ more suitable for a differential attack.
Theorem 4.4.10. Let ◦ be an operation as in Setting 1. Then for each
x, k,∆ ∈ V
(x+ k) ◦ ((x ◦∆) + k) = ∆ + k ·∆ + k ·∆ · x. (4.2)
Proof. The proof directly follows using the distributivity of · over +. Indeed,
let x, k,∆ ∈ V . Then
(x+ k) ◦ ((x ◦∆) + k) = (x+ k) ◦ (x+ ∆ + x ·∆ + k)
= x+ k + x+ ∆ + x ·∆ + k
+(x+ k) · (x+ ∆ + x ·∆ + k)
= ∆ + x ·∆ + x · x+ x ·∆ + x · x ·∆
+x · k + k · x+ k ·∆ + k ·∆ · x+ k · k
= ∆ + k ·∆ + k ·∆ · x.
We have rewritten the output difference of the key-addition layer in a way
it does not depend explicitly on ◦. However it still depends on x and k. What
we gained is that we can derive an interpretation of the dot product that will
allow to simplify Eq. (4.2). Before doing this by refining our assumptions,
let us show a result which will be helpful in the following sections.
Lemma 4.4.11. Let ◦ be an operation as in Setting 1. Then for each a, b ∈ V
it holds σa·b = σaτbσaτb.
Proof. Let a, b ∈ V . First of all let us notice that τbσaτb = τ−1b σaτb ∈ T+ since
T◦ < AGL(V,+) = NSym(V )(T+), and consequently σaτbσaτb ∈ T+. From
0σaτbσaτb = a ◦ b+ a+ b = a · b
the desired holds.
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4.4.2 Assumptions on the weak keys
We showed that W◦ is a non-trivial vector space, i.e. every operation as in
Setting 1 admits weak keys. For reasons that will be clearer later, we want
to set the position of the weak keys in the block. For this reason, we assume
that W◦ is generated by a given set of vectors. Even if this set might be
chosen arbitrarily, we will assume from now on that W◦ is generated by the
last d vector of the canonical basis, since this will force the matrices defining
the operation to have a precise block form.
In what follows, we denote by d the dimension of the weak-key space, i.e.
d
def
= dim(W◦).
Setting 2. The operation ◦ satisfies the hypotheses of Setting 1 and, if d =
dim(W◦), then W◦ = Span{en−d+1, . . . , en}.
Under this hypothesis, the matrices defining ◦ are into the block form
showed in the following result.
Theorem 4.4.12. Let ◦ be as in Setting 2. Then, for each a ∈ V there exist
Πa ∈ GL
(
(F2)n−d,+
)
and Σa ∈ (F2)(n−d)×d such that
Ma =
(
Πa Σa
0
d,n−d 1d
)
.
Proof. Let a ∈ V , and let i ∈ {n− d+ 1, . . . , n}. Since ◦ is abelian and ei is
a weak key it holds
a+ ei = a ◦ ei = ei ◦ a = eiMa + a,
hence eiMa = ei, which means that the i
th row of Ma is ei.
Understanding the dot product
Let us fix a, b ∈ V and see in detail what the dot product represents. Since
V = W⊥ ⊕ W , we can write a = (a¯, a˜), with a¯ ∈ (F2)n−d and a˜ ∈ (F2)d.
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Then
a · b = aMb + b+ a+ b
= (a¯, a˜)
(
Πb Σb
0
d,n−d 1d
)
+ a
= (a¯Πb, a¯Σb + a˜) + a
= (a¯Πb + a¯, a¯Σb) , (4.3)
which does not depend on a˜, the component of a in the space of weak keys.
4.4.3 Assumptions on ◦-affinities
Let us come back now to our main concern regarding the key-addition layer,
i.e. the fact that its output difference depends on the message, on the key,
and on the input difference, as displayed in Theorem 4.4.10. It is clear that
we significantly reduce the impact of the key-addition layer on ◦-differential
probabilities if, for example, we succeed in finding suitable hypotheses which
make the value of Eq. (4.1) independent on the message x. This is obtain-
able, by virtue of Lemma 2.3.1 (mutatis mutantis), by forcing the XOR-
translations to behave as “◦-affinities”. Indeed, writing
(x+ k) ◦ ((x ◦∆) + k) = (xσk) ◦ ((x ◦∆)σk),
if σk = fkτT for a “◦-linear function” fk and some T ∈ V , we obtain
(x+ k) ◦ ((x ◦∆) + k) = (xσk) ◦ ((x ◦∆)σk)
= xfk ◦ T ◦ ((x ◦∆)fk ◦ T )
= xfk ◦ T ◦ xfk ◦∆fk ◦ T
= ∆fk,
which does not depend on x anymore. In order to do this, a precise definition
of ◦-affinities is required. Let us recall that AGL(V,+), i.e. the group of all
the +-affinities, can be seen as the normaliser in the symmetric group of the
+-translation group, i.e. AGL(V,+) = NSym(V )(T+). In a similar way, let us
define
AGL(V, ◦) def= NSym(V )(T◦)
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as the group of the ◦-affine functions. The stabiliser of 0 in AGL(V, ◦) rep-
resents the subgroup of all the ◦-linear functions, i.e.
GL(V, ◦) def= AGL(V, ◦)0.
The following important result [CS17] is a description of the matrices
defining an operation ◦ such that the +-translations behave like ◦-affinities.
Theorem 4.4.13. Let T◦ be as in Setting 2. If T+ < AGL(V, ◦), then for
each a ∈ V there exists a matrix Σa ∈ (F2) (n−d)×d such that
Ma =
(
1n−d Σa
0
d,n−d 1d
)
.
Proof. Let a ∈ V . Since T◦ satisfies the hypotheses of Setting 2, from The-
orem 4.4.12 there exist Πa ∈ GL
(
(F2)n−d,+
)
and Σa ∈ (F2)(n−d)×d such
that
Ma =
(
Πa Σa
0
d,n−d 1d
)
.
Moreover, from T+ < AGL(V, ◦) we obtain the T+ normalises T◦, which
means that for each b ∈ V
σa·b = σ−1a τ
−1
b σaτb ∈ T◦,
and, from Lemma 4.4.3, this is equivalent to saying that a · b ∈ W◦. From
this and from Eq. (4.3),
(
b¯Πa + b¯, b¯Σa
) ∈ W◦, which implies b¯Πa + b¯ = 0.
The conclusion yields from the generality of b.
Setting 3. The operation ◦ is as in Setting 2 and T+ < AGL(V, ◦).
Operations as in Setting 3 are also known as effective hidden sums [BCS17].
Remark 4.4.14. Notice that in Theorem 4.4.13 we also proved that, if the
hypotheses of Setting 3 hold, for each x, y ∈ V , x · y is a weak key. In
particular, from Remark 4.4.8 follows that every triple dot product is null,
i.e. a · b · c = 0 for each a, b, c ∈ V . The opposite implication also applies,
i.e. if a · b · c = 0 for each c ∈ V , then a · b ∈ W◦.
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In the previous hypothesis, the vectors {ei}ni=1 are a basis for both (V,+)
and (V, ◦), and this is basically granted from the fact that for each a, b ∈ V
it holds a · b ∈ W◦ = Span{en−d+1, . . . , en}. Indeed, let us consider a ∈ V
and let us decompose
a = ξ1e1 + ξ2e2 + . . . ξnen. (4.4)
In order to determine the coefficients of the decomposition of a with respect
to ◦ and to the canonical basis, we can proceed as follows: let us write the
first two addends of Eq. (4.4) as ξ1e1 + ξ2e2 = ξ1e1 ◦ ξ2e2 + ξ1e1 · ξ2e2. Since
ξ1e1 ·ξ2e2 ∈ W◦, we can equivalently write ξ1e1 +ξ2e2 = ξ1e1 ◦ξ2e2 ◦ξ1e1 ·ξ2e2,
where ξ1e1 · ξ2e2 = ξ′wiew1 for some n− d+ 1 ≤ w1 ≤ n and ξ′wi ∈ F2. We can
then rewrite Eq. (4.4) as
a = (ξ1e1 ◦ ξ2e2 ◦ ξ′w1ew1) + ξ3e3 + . . . ξnen.
One can proceed in the same way until for all the non-weak vector of the
canonical basis, every occurrence of + is replaced by ◦, obtaining
a = ξ′1e1 ◦ ξ′2e2 ◦ . . . ξ′nen. (4.5)
Notice that, the coefficients ξ′i in Eq. (4.5) satisfy the following:
• if 1 ≤ i ≤ n− d, then ξ′i = ξi;
• if n − d + 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then ξ′i = µi, where µi’s are the coefficient of
a ◦ e1 ◦ e2 ◦ . . . ◦ en−d.
From this fact, an algorithm which computes the coefficients of a with re-
spect to ◦ and the canonical basis can be easily derived.
Let us now show that, if the dimension of the space is sufficiently small,
operations as in Setting 2 satisfy the hypotheses of Setting 3. This result
still holds in a more general setting. A more general version can be found in
[CS17].
Theorem 4.4.15. Let ◦ be as in Setting 2. If n ≤ 6, then T+ < AGL(V, ◦).
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Proof. Let us assume T+ 6< AGL(V, ◦). Then, by Remark 4.4.14 there exist
x, y, z ∈ V such that x ·y ·z 6= 0. Let us show that x, y, z, x ·y, x ·z, y ·z, x ·y ·z
are linearly independent. Let ξi ∈ F2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 7 such that
ξ1x+ ξ2y + ξ3z + ξ4x · y + ξ5x · z + ξ6y · y + ξ7x · y · z = 0.
By multiplying each member of the previous equation by y · z we obtain
ξ1x · y · z = 0, which implies ξ1 = 0. In the same way, by multiplying by
x · z we prove ξ2 = 0. Proceeding in this way one proves that ξi = 0 for each
1 ≤ i ≤ 7.
If Φ is an n-bit cipher this result may seems insignificant, since for sure
n >> 6. However, operations ◦ can also be defined only on some bricks of
the block, as we will show later. In this case, it does make sense to consider
operations defined on smaller spaces, for example of the same size of the
S-boxes. Consequently, Theorem 4.4.15 can be applied when considering e.g.
ciphers having 3 or 4-bit S-boxes.
4.4.4 A more compact representation
In this section we will present a compact way to represent operations satis-
fying our last assumption, described also in [BCS17]. From this, some useful
properties will be derived. As shown in Theorem 4.4.13, an operation as in
Setting 3 is such that the matrices Mei for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n are in a precise
block form. Let us denote by bi,j the last d components of the j-th row of
Mei in such a way that we can represent
Mei =
(
1n−d Σei
0
d,n−d 1d
)
=
 1n−d
bi,1
...
bi,n−d
0
d,n−d 1d
 .
Notice that, by the assumption W◦ = Span{en−d+1, . . . , en} we have Σei = 0
for each n−d+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This incidentally implies that only n−d matrices
have to be stored in order to compute ◦. In the light of these considerations,
an operation as in Setting 3 is defined when the matrices Σe1 ,Σe2 , . . . ,Σen−d
63
Interaction with the key-addition layer
are given. Interpreting each row of Σei as an element of the finite field F2d ,
we can easily represent all the Σeis in a matrix in (F2d)(n−d)×(n−d) as follows:
(Σe1 ,Σe2 , . . . ,Σen−d) =

b1,1 b1,2 · · · b1,n−d
b2,1 b2,2 · · · b2,n−d
...
...
. . .
...
bn−d,1 bn−d,2 · · · bn−d,n−d
 . (4.6)
We say that the matrix in Eq. (4.6) defines the operation ◦.
Remark 4.4.16. Let us highlight some properties of the elements bi,j :
• from the fact that T◦ is 2-elementary, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n − d it holds
ei ◦ ei = 0, which means bi,i = 0;
• since for each 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n− d we have ei ◦ ej = ej ◦ ei, then bi,j = bj,i.
The following theorem is a characterisation of the operations satisfying
the hypotheses of Setting 3.
Theorem 4.4.17. Let ◦ be an operation as in Setting 1, and let d = dim(W◦) ≤
n − 2. A matrix Θ ∈ F(n−d)×(n−d)
2d
defines an operation ◦ such that T+ <
AGL(V, ◦) and W◦ = Span{en−d+1, . . . , en} (i.e. an operation as in Setting 3)
if and only if Θ is zero-diagonal, symmetric and no F2-linear combination of
columns of Θ is the null vector.
Proof. Part of this result has already been proven in Theorem 4.4.13. Indeed,
if we assume that the hypotheses of Setting 3 hold, then for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n−d
we can write
Mei =
(
1n−d Σei
0
d,n−d 1d
)
,
hence Θ is the matrix built as in Eq. (4.6), whose columns are filled with
the rows of the matrices Σei ’s. From Remark 4.4.16 it follows that Θ is
zero-diagonal and symmetric. Moreover, let us assume that an F2-linear
combination of columns of Θ is the null vector. Without loss of generality,
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let us assume Σe1 + Σe2 = 0. From this it follows that
Me1◦e2 = Me1Me2 =
(
1n−d Σe1
0
d,n−d 1d
)(
1n−d Σe2
0
d,n−d 1d
)
=
(
1n−d Σe1 + Σe2
0
d,n−d 1d
)
= 1n,
which implies e1 ◦ e2 = w, for some w ∈ W◦, i.e. e1 = e2 ◦ w = e2 + w. This
proves that e1 + e2 ∈ W◦, which is a contradiction.
In the light of the previous result, the following definition comes naturally.
Definition 4.4.18. A matrix Θ◦ ∈ F(n−d)×(n−d)2d is called the defining matrix
of an operation ◦ as in Setting 3 if
Θ◦ =

0 b2,1 · · · bn−d,1
b2,1 0 · · · bn−d,2
...
...
. . .
...
bn−d,1 bn−d,2 · · · 0
 (4.7)
and no F2-linear combination of columns of Θ◦ is the null vector. In this case,
the operation ◦ is defined by letting Σei = Θ◦[·, i] for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n− d.
In the following result (see also [BCS17]) we prove a more precise lower
bound for the dimension of the weak-key space, improving consequently what
already proven in Theorem 4.4.2 and Theorem 4.4.5. Although the minimal
hypotheses are those of Setting 1, we prove the result in the case that matter
for our purposes, i.e. the one of Setting 3. The proof relies on the following
lemma, whose proof may be found e.g. in [MMMM13].
Lemma 4.4.19. There is no symmetric zero-diagonal invertible matrix of
odd dimension over the field F2.
Theorem 4.4.20. Let ◦ be an operation as in Setting 3, and let us assume
T◦ 6= T+. Then
2− (n mod 2) ≤ dim (W◦) ≤ n− 2.
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Proof. The upper bound has been proved in more general hypotheses in
Theorem 4.4.5. Let us now assume n even and assume by contradiction
that d = 1. Then, if Θ is the defining matrix of the operation, Θ is a
matrix in (F2)(n−1)×(n−1) which is symmetric and zero-diagonal. Notice also
that the condition on the F2-linear combinations of columns of Θ given in
Theorem 4.4.17, in the case d = 1 is equivalent to saying that Θ is invertible.
The previous lemma leads to the desired contradiction.
The cases of n = 3, n = 4, and other small values
The problem of counting the operations as in Setting 3 having a given size n
and a given compatible weak-key space dimension d is equivalent to counting
all the possible matrices like in Theorem 4.4.17, i.e. all the possible defining
matrices. This task is demanding, and it has partially treated in the seminal
works [CS17, BCS17]. However a complete description of these operations
can be easily given if the space size is small. With an eye on considering
operations having the size of classical small S-boxes, let us focus on the case
n ∈ {3, 4}.
n=3
Example 4.4.21. Due to Theorem 4.4.20, d = 1 is the only value which
is admissible with n = 3. In this case, a matrix Θ is the defining matrix
of an operation with n = 3 and d = 1 if and only if Θ ∈ (F2)(2×2) and it
is symmetric, zero-diagonal, and non-singular. Only one matrix in (F2)(2×2)
meets these requirements. Such a matrix is
Θ =
(
0 1
1 0
)
.
The submatrices Σe1 and Σe2 of the matrices Me1 and Me2 can be read in
the first and in the second column of Θ, i.e. the operation is defined by the
following matrices
Me1 =
 1 0 00 1 1
0 0 1
 , Me2 =
 1 0 10 1 0
0 0 1
 , Me3 = 13 .
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Since it will be helpful in the remainder of the work, let us reserve the symbol
 for the previously defined operation.
n=4
Example 4.4.22. In this case, again for Theorem 4.4.20, d = 2 is the only
admissible value. A defining matrix is of the form(
0 α
α 0
)
,
where α is non-null in the field F22 . Since it can be chosen if three different
ways, we obtain that three operations as in Setting 3 can be considered when
n = 4. Those are defined by the three lists below:Me1 =
 12 0 00 1
02 12
 , Me2 =
 12 0 10 0
02 12
 , Me3 = Me4 = 14
 ,
Me1 =
 12 0 01 0
02 12
 , Me2 =
 12 1 00 0
02 12
 , Me3 = Me4 = 14
 ,
Me1 =
 12 0 01 1
02 12
 , Me2 =
 12 1 10 0
02 12
 , Me3 = Me4 = 14
 .
More in general For n ∈ {5, 6, 7} the number of the operations as in
Setting 3 has been computed in [BCS17] using the software MAGMA. A
summary of the results obtained is displayed in Tab. 4.1. For n = 8 only
partial results are known.
4.4.5 Differential probabilities and key-addition layer
In this section we will study how differential probabilities may vary as a func-
tion of the operation which is used to compute differentials. In order to keep
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n d number of operations as in Setting 3
3 1 1
4 2 3
1 28
5 2 42
3 7
2 3969
6 3 462
4 15
1 13888
2 937440
7 3 254968
4 3990
5 31
2 unknown
3 unknown
8 4 unknown
5 32500
6 63
Table 4.1: Number of operations for small values of n and d.
the notation light, from now on, by saying an operation we will be referring
to an operation satisfying the hypotheses of Setting 3.
Let us recall that a+ b = a ◦ b+ a · b = a ◦ b ◦ a · b. By definition of · we
can say that a · b represents the error committed when confusing a ◦ b with
a+ b. This consideration justifies the following definition.
Definition 4.4.23. Let ◦ be an operation as in Setting 3. Let us define the
set of errors
U◦
def
= {a · b | a, b ∈ V },
i.e. the set of all the possible dot products in V . Each element in U◦ is called
an error.
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Remark 4.4.24. As we already noticed in Remark 4.4.14, every error is a
weak key. Hence U◦ ⊆ W◦. Therefore, for each x, y ∈ V there exists ux,y ∈ U◦
such that
x+ y = x ◦ y + ux,y, (4.8)
with ux,y = x · y = (0, x˜Σy). It is easy to notice that U◦ is composed of all
the possible vectors w ∈ W◦ whose last d-components are all the possible
F2-linear combinations of the rows of the matrices Σy for each y ∈ V , i.e.
U◦ =

0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−d
,
∑
ξj∈F2
(
ξj
(∑
µi∈F2
µiΣei
)
[j, ·]
) .
Example 4.4.25. In Fig. 4.1, + and the operation  defined in Exam-
ple 4.4.21 are compared. Notice that W = {0, e3} = {0x, 1x}, and so the
first two rows and columns in the tables are equal. Different entries are em-
phasised. Moreover, since U ⊆ W, it also holds U = W, and consequently,
if x + y 6= x  y, then from Eq. (4.8) it follows x + y = x  y + 1x, as it can
be seen in Fig. 4.1.
We can then restate Theorem 4.4.10 in the light of the newer hypotheses
on ◦, showing that in the hypotheses of Setting 3, as expected, the output
◦-difference after the key-addition layer does not depend on the message x.
Theorem 4.4.26. Let ◦ be an operation as in Setting 3. Then for each
x, k,∆ ∈ V
(x+ k) ◦ ((x ◦∆) + k) = ∆ + k ·∆ ∈ ∆ + U◦. (4.9)
Proof. The proof comes directly from Theorem 4.4.10, where the triple prod-
uct in Eq. (4.2) vanishes for Remark 4.4.14.
Remark 4.4.27. It is worth noting here that the expected output difference
after the key-addition layer, given in input a difference ∆, can be either ∆
or ∆ plus an error, which depends on ∆ and on the key k used. Hence,
the larger the number #U◦ − 1 of non-null errors, the less the effect of the
key-addition layer can be controlled.
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+ 0x 1x 2x 3x 4x 5x 6x 7x
0x 0x 1x 2x 3x 4x 5x 6x 7x
1x 1x 0x 3x 2x 5x 4x 7x 6x
2x 2x 3x 0x 1x 6x 7x 4x 5x
3x 3x 2x 1x 0x 7x 6x 5x 4x
4x 4x 5x 6x 7x 0x 1x 2x 3x
5x 5x 4x 7x 6x 1x 0x 3x 2x
6x 6x 7x 4x 5x 2x 3x 0x 1x
7x 7x 6x 5x 4x 3x 2x 1x 0x
 0x 1x 2x 3x 4x 5x 6x 7x
0x 0x 1x 2x 3x 4x 5x 6x 7x
1x 1x 0x 3x 2x 5x 4x 7x 6x
2x 2x 3x 0x 1x 7x 6x 5x 4x
3x 3x 2x 1x 0x 6x 7x 4x 5x
4x 4x 5x 7x 6x 0x 1x 3x 2x
5x 5x 4x 6x 7x 1x 0x 2x 3x
6x 6x 7x 5x 4x 3x 2x 0x 1x
7x 7x 6x 4x 5x 2x 3x 1x 0x
Figure 4.1: Comparison between operation + and 
70
Interaction with the key-addition layer
In order to keep track of the bias introduced by the key-addition layer
with respect to ◦-differences, let us store in a table all the information which
are required to predict how ◦-differences pass through the key-addition layer.
While the DDT is a bi-dimensional table based on the confusion layer, gath-
ering information on the number of messages following a differential, Theo-
rem 4.4.26 states that we can construct an equivalent table, for operations
in Setting 3, gathering information on the number of keys following a differ-
ential.
Definition 4.4.28. Let ◦ be an operation as in Setting 3. The key distribu-
tion table (KDT) of ◦ is the integer table ∈ Zn×n where
KDT◦[∆I ,∆O]
def
= #{k ∈ (F2)n | ∆I + k ·∆I = ∆O}.
The key distribution table can be read in the following way: whenever
the input difference is in the weak-key space, i.e. ∆I ∈ W◦, then, no matter
the key considered, the output difference after the key-addition layer is ∆I
with probability 1. This is because, if ∆I ∈ W◦, then
(x+ k) ◦ ((x ◦∆I) + k) = ∆I + k ·∆I = ∆I
for each k, since the error corresponding to k and ∆I is always null. If
∆I /∈ W◦, the output difference equals ∆I + k ·∆I . The error may be zero,
leading to the output difference ∆I (this is always the case e.g. when k ∈ W◦),
or may be different from zero, leading to ∆I + u for some u ∈ U◦.
Example 4.4.29. We computed the key distribution table of the operation
 defined in Example 4.4.21. Since, as shown in Example 4.4.25, U = W =
{0x, 1x}, then considering e.g. the -difference ∆I = 2x, the -difference after
key-addition layer may be either ∆O = 2x = 2x + 0x or ∆O = 3x = 2x + 1x.
Each event happens with probability 1/2, as it can be noticed in Fig. 4.2.
Example 4.4.30. Let n = 5, d = 2, and let us consider the operation ◦
having the following defining matrix
Θ =
0 a ba 0 a
b a 0
 ,
where a = (1, 1) and b = (1, 0). The table KDT◦ is displayed in Fig. 4.3.
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0x 1x 2x 3x 4x 5x 6x 7x
0x 8 · · · · · · ·
1x · 8 · · · · · ·
2x · · 4 4 · · · ·
3x · · 4 4 · · · ·
4x · · · · 4 4 · ·
5x · · · · 4 4 · ·
6x · · · · · · 4 4
7x · · · · · · 4 4
Figure 4.2: Key distribution table of 
The tables displayed in the two previous examples are symmetric. This
is a general rule, as showed in the following result.
Theorem 4.4.31. For each operation ◦ as in Setting 3, the table KDT◦ is
symmetric.
Proof. Let us fix ∆1,∆2, k ∈ V and suppose that ∆1 + k ·∆1 = ∆2. Then
∆2 + k ·∆2 = ∆1 + k ·∆1 + k · (∆1 + k ·∆1)
= ∆1 + k ·∆1 + k ·∆1 + k · k ·∆1
= ∆1,
therefore KDT[∆1,∆2] = KDT[∆2,∆1].
Notice that the symmetry of the key-distribution table is based on the fact
that triple products are always null, i.e. it crucially depends on the hypothe-
ses of Setting 3.
It is worth noting that the number of non-zero entries in a key distri-
bution table is an important feature in terms of understanding differential
weaknesses of the cipher. Indeed, the less they are, the more the key-addition
layer effect on ◦-differences can be controlled. We will consider in the next
chapter a particular case which seems the most convenient for this purpose.
In order to compute this number in general, the following result is helpful.
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Interaction with the key-addition layer
Theorem 4.4.32. Let ◦ be an operation as in Setting 3. For each a ∈ V it
holds Rank(Σa) ≤ min(n− d− 1, d).
Proof. If a ∈ W◦ there is nothing to prove. If not, then a = (a¯, a˜), with
a¯ 6= 0. Since 0 = a ◦ a = aMa + a, it follows a(Ma + 1n) = 0. This implies,
from the description of Ma given in Theorem 4.4.13, that
a ∈ Ker
(
0 Σa
0 0
)
.
Therefore a¯ ∈ Ker(Σa). From this it follows
Rank(Σa) = dim(Im(Σa)) = n− d− dim(Ker(Σa)) ≤ n− d− 1.
Now, if n−d−1 ≤ d, then the result holds. If not, then d < n−d−1 < n−d,
whence Rank(Σa) ≤ d = min(n− d− 1, d).
Theorem 4.4.33. Let ◦ be an operation as in Setting 3. The number of non-
zero entries in each row of the key distribution table KDT◦ is upper bounded
by 2 min(n−d−1,d).
Proof. Given a fixed ∆ ∈ V , the number of non-zero entries in the row
KDT[∆, ·] depends on the values of k · ∆, for each k ∈ V . Since k · ∆ =
k¯Σ∆ ∈ Im(Σ∆), and dim(Im(Σ∆)) = Rank(Σ∆) ≤ min(n − d − 1, d) for
Theorem 4.4.32, the desired holds.
Remark 4.4.34. Notice that the upper bound reaches its minimum value,
i.e. 2, if d = 1 or d = n− 2.
Corollary 4.4.35. Let ◦ be an operation as in Setting 3 and let ∆I ∈ V .
Then, for each ∆O ∈ V it holds
KDT◦[∆I ,∆O] ∈
{
0, 2n−Rank(Σ∆I )
}
.
Proof. Let ∆O ∈ V such that KDT[∆I ,∆O] 6= 0. Two keys k1, k2 ∈ V are
such that k1 ·∆I = k2 ·∆I = ∆O if k¯1 and k¯2 are in the same class modulo
Ker(Σ∆I ). Recalling that the value of k · ∆ does not depend on the last d
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bits of k, then KDT◦[∆I ,∆O] is the number of elements contained in each
class modulo Ker(Σ∆I ) multiplied by 2
d. Therefore
KDT◦[∆I ,∆O] = 2d 2
dim(Ker(Σ∆I ))
= 2d 2n−d−Rank(Σ∆I )
= 2n−Rank(Σ∆I ).
Example 4.4.36. Notice that, in general, the set of errors is not a vector
space. Indeed, let us consider the following operation having n = 8 and d = 4
and defined by the defining matrix
Θ =

(0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0, 1) (1, 0, 0, 1) (1, 0, 1, 1)
(0, 0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1, 1) (0, 1, 1, 1)
(1, 0, 0, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1) (0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0, 1)
(1, 0, 1, 1) (0, 1, 1, 1) (1, 0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 0, 0)
 .
Computing all the possible dot products, one can notice that #U◦ = 15,
hence U◦ is not a vector space. However, n = 8 is the first value for which
this happens.
4.5 Interaction with the confusion layer
While in classical differential cryptanalysis differential probabilities are only
induced by the confusion layer, in the previous section we illustrate that,
with new operations, probabilities are also added by the key-addition layer.
For the probability of a ◦-differential to be larger than the probability of a
+-differential, we should either have trails with larger probabilities and / or
more trails. The first goal can only be achieved if the values in the DDT of
the S-box computed with respect to ◦ are larger that those in the classical
DDT computed with respect to the XOR. In the following section we show
through several examples that this is possible. Before doing so, let us notice
that the difference distribution table of a vectorial Boolean function can be
defined more in general, considering differences induced by whatever opera-
tion whose group of translations is elementary, abelian, and regular (XOR
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included).
Let ◦ be an operation as in Setting 1. Proceeding in the same way of Sec-
tion 2.4.1, the derivative of a vectorial Boolean function f : (F2)n → (F2)n
in the direction u ∈ (F2)n with respect to the operation ◦, denoted by ∂◦u f is
the function
∂◦u f : (F2)n → (F2)n
x 7→ xf ◦ (x ◦ u)f.
Then, the difference distribution table (DDT◦) of f with respect to the opera-
tion ◦ is the integer table DDT◦f ∈ Zn×n defined for u ∈ (F2)n and v ∈ (F2)n
as
DDT◦f [u, v]
def
= δ◦f (u, v),
where
δ◦f (u, v)
def
= #{x ∈ (F2)n | x ∂◦u f = v}.
The differential uniformity of f with respect to ◦ is defined as
δ◦(f) def= max
u,v
u6=0
DDT◦f [u, v],
and the function f is said to be δ-differentially uniform with respect to ◦ if
δ = δ◦(f).
In the following examples it is shown how the non-linearity of vectorial
Boolean functions used as S-boxes for famous block ciphers may change when
differentials are computed with respect to another operation.
Example 4.5.1. Let us consider the following S-box γ′ : (F2)3 → (F2)3
which is affinely equivalent to the power function x 7→ x3:
x 0x 1x 2x 3x 4x 5x 6x 7x
x γ′ 0x 6x 2x 1x 5x 7x 4x 3x
.
We have computed the difference distribution table of γ′ with respect to +
and to the operation  defined in Example 4.4.21. The given function is well-
known to be APN with respect to + [Nyb93]. However, this property does
not hold when looking at -differences. As can be noticed in Fig. 4.4, where
the difference distribution tables of γ′ with respect to + and  respectively
are displayed, γ′ is 8-differentially uniform with respect to .
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+ 0x 1x 2x 3x 4x 5x 6x 7x
0x 8 · · · · · · ·
1x · · 2 2 · · 2 2
2x · 2 2 · 2 · · 2
3x · 2 · 2 2 · 2 ·
4x · 2 2 · · 2 2 ·
5x · 2 · 2 · 2 · 2
6x · · · · 2 2 2 2
7x · · 2 2 2 2 · ·
 0x 1x 2x 3x 4x 5x 6x 7x
0x 8 · · · · · · ·
1x · · · 4 · · 4 ·
2x · · 4 · · · · 4
3x · 4 · · · 4 · ·
4x · 4 · · · 4 · ·
5x · · 4 · · · · 4
6x · · · · 8 · · ·
7x · · · 4 · · 4 ·
Figure 4.4: Difference distribution table of γ′ : x 7→ x3 over (F2)3 defined in
Example 4.5.1 with respect to + and 
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Example 4.5.2. The S-box S2 of the cipher SERPENT [BAK98] is 4-
differentially uniform with respect to +. However, if differentials are com-
puted with respect to the operation ◦ defined in Example 4.4.22 obtained
considering α = (0, 1), we obtain that S2 is a 10-differentially uniform func-
tion with respect to the given operation ◦. The complete DDTs of S2 with
respect to + and ◦ are displayed in Fig. 4.5.
In general, the following bound holds.
Theorem 4.5.3. Let ◦ an operation as in Setting 3. Let γ : (F2)n → (F2)n
a vectorial Boolean function and let us assume that γ is δ+-differentially
uniform and δ◦-differentially uniform with respect to + and ◦, respectively.
Then we have the following relation between δ+ and δ◦:
δ◦ ≤ min (δ+ (#U◦)2 , 2n) .
In particular for ∆I 6= 0, we have
max
∆O
DDT◦γ[∆I ,∆O] ≤
min (δ+#U◦, 2n) ∆I ∈ W◦min (δ+ (#U◦)2 , 2n) ∆I /∈ W◦.
Proof. Let ∆I ,∆O ∈ V . We are interested in the number of solutions of the
following equation:
xγ ◦ (x ◦∆I)γ = ∆O. (4.10)
Rewriting Eq. (4.10) introducing the dot products, we obtain
xγ + (x+ ∆I + u)γ = ∆O + w, (4.11)
where u = ux,∆I = x · ∆I , w = wx,∆I = xγ · (x ◦ ∆I)γ, and u,w ∈ U◦.
For any possible choice of u,w ∈ U◦, Eq. (4.11) admits at most δ solutions,
hence δ◦γ(∆I ,∆O) ≤ δ+ (#U◦)2 In particular, if ∆I ∈ W◦, then u = 0, and
consequently we derive δ◦γ(∆I ,∆O) ≤ δ+#U◦. The proof is then concluded.
The bound of the previous result can be quite loose though, especially
when #U◦ is large or when #U◦ in not a subspace. However, in the case
described in the following section, and more in general for small values of n
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+ 0x 1x 2x 3x 4x 5x 6x 7x 8x 9x Ax Bx Cx Dx Ex Fx
0x 16 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1x · · · · · 2 · 2 · · 2 2 2 · 4 2
2x · · · 4 · 4 · · · 4 · · · · · 4
3x · 4 2 · · · 2 · · 2 · · 2 · 2 2
4x · · · · · · 4 · · · 4 4 · 4 · ·
5x · 4 · 2 2 2 2 · 2 · · · 2 · · ·
6x · · 2 2 2 2 · · 2 2 · · · · 2 2
7x · · · · 4 2 · 2 · · 2 2 2 · · 2
8x · · · 2 · 2 · 4 · 2 · · · 4 · 2
9x · · · 2 · · · 2 4 2 2 2 2 · · ·
Ax · · 2 · 2 · 4 · 2 · 4 · · · 2 ·
Bx · 4 · · 2 · 2 · 2 2 · · 2 · · 2
Cx · · 2 · 2 · · · 2 · · 4 · 4 2 ·
Dx · 4 2 2 · 2 2 · · · · · 2 · 2 ·
Ex · · 2 · 2 · · 4 2 · · · · 4 2 ·
Fx · · 4 2 · · · 2 · 2 2 2 2 · · ·
◦ 0x 1x 2x 3x 4x 5x 6x 7x 8x 9x Ax Bx Cx Dx Ex Fx
0x 16 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1x · · · · 2 · · 2 · · · 4 2 · · 6
2x · · · 4 · 4 · · · 4 · · · · 4 ·
3x · 4 2 · · · · 2 2 · · · 2 · · 4
4x · 4 · · · · · 4 · · · 4 4 · · ·
5x · · · 2 · 4 2 · · 2 4 · · 2 · ·
6x · · 2 · 10 · · · 2 · · · · · · 2
7x · · · 2 · · 2 · · 2 4 · · 2 4 ·
8x · · · · 2 · · 2 6 · · 2 4 · · ·
9x · · · 4 · · 4 · · 2 2 · · 2 2 ·
Ax · 4 2 · · · · 2 4 · · 2 · · · 2
Bx · · · · · 4 4 · · 2 2 · · 2 2 ·
Cx · 4 4 · · · · · 2 · · 2 2 · · 2
Dx · · · 2 · 4 2 · · · 2 · · 4 2 ·
Ex · · 6 · 2 · · 4 · · · 2 2 · · ·
Fx · · · 2 · · 2 · · 4 2 · · 4 2 ·
Figure 4.5: Difference distribution table of the S-box S2 of SERPENT with
respect to + and ◦
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compatible with the dimension of a real-life S-box, it is tight in most of the
cases.
Although we did not reach a deep knowledge in the interaction between a
general confusion layer and any operation ◦, since it depends on the complex
interaction between the two additive operations on the vector space + and
◦ and the finite field addition and multiplication, we achieved some partial
results which can be helpful in order to understand, for example, how we
obtained the S-box of Example 4.5.1.
4.5.1 On the cubic function in odd dimension
Let us recall that, when interpreting x ∈ F2n as a vector in (F2)n and, vice
versa, a vector x ∈ (F2)n as an element of the finite field F2n , we are tac-
itly fixing a bijective correspondence Ψ : (F2)n → F2n . For example, when
considering x ∈ (F2)n and writing e.g. Tr (x), we mean (Tr (xΨ)) Ψ−1, where
Tr denote the trace over F2. Analogously, if y ∈ (F2)n such that y 6= 0,
then x/y denotes
(
xΨ (yΨ)−1
)
Ψ−1. The aim of this section is to illustrate
that, depending on the way we identify (F2)n and F2n , we can transform
an APN permutation into a permutation with higher differential uniformity
with respect to another operation. For this reason, let us assume n odd and
let us study the power function x 7→ x3 on F2n . Recall that such a map is
a permutation when n is odd and it is APN with respect to the XOR [Nyb93].
Following the classical proof used to derive the differential properties of the
cubic function, we aim at determining the number of solutions of the equation
x3 ◦ (x ◦∆I)3 = ∆O (4.12)
for each ∆I ,∆O ∈ (F2)n and for each operation ◦. As already said, the
interaction between all the operations defined is complex, hence let us focus
on the case which matters more for our purposes (see Remark 4.4.34), i.e.
the case of operations ◦ such that d = n−2. Recall that for such operations,
by Remark 4.4.24, it holds #U◦ = 2. Let us only focus on the case where ∆I
is the non-null error. The next result shows that if U◦ is the 1-dimensional
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space spanned by ∆I and Eq. (4.12) admits at least four solution for some
∆O (which at the same time means that x 7→ x3 is δ-differentially uniform
with respect to ◦, with δ ≥ 4), then Tr(1/∆I) = 0. Also note that according
to Theorem 4.5.3, max∆O DDT
◦[∆I ,∆O] ≤ 4 in the case where ∆I ∈ U◦,
∆I 6= 0.
Proposition 4.5.4. Let ◦ be an operation as in Setting 3 and such that
d = n− 2. Let ∆I ∈ V \ {0} such that U◦ = Span{∆I}. If
max
∆O
DDT◦[∆I ,∆O] > 2,
then Tr(1/∆I) = 0. Equivalently, if Tr(1/∆I) = 1, then the equation x
3 ◦
(x ◦∆I)3 = ∆O admits at most 2 solutions for each ∆O.
Proof. Since U◦ ⊆ W◦, ∆I is also a weak vector, hence Eq. (4.12) can be
written as
x3 + (x+ ∆I)
3 = ∆O + w, (4.13)
where w = εx3,(x+∆I)3 ∈ W◦, according to Remark 4.4.24. Moreover, notice
that when Eq. (4.13) holds, then(
x
∆I
)2
+
x
∆I
= 1 +
∆O + w
∆3I
,
which, by means of a change of variable, can be written as
x2 + x = 1 +
∆O + w
∆3I
.
This implies, since n is odd, that
Tr
(
∆O + w
∆3I
)
= 1. (4.14)
Let us now assume that Eq. (4.13) admits four solutions x1, x2, x1 + ∆I and
x2 +∆I . This means that there exist w1, w2 ∈ U◦ such that x31 +(x1 +∆I)3 =
∆O +w1 and x
3
2 + (x2 + ∆I)
3 = ∆O +w2. Notice that w1 6= w2. Indeed, if we
assume w1 = w2, then Eq. (4.13), and consequently Eq. (4.12), admits four
solutions, running counter to the fact that x 7→ x3 is APN. Since wi ∈ U◦,
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we can assume without loss of generality that w1 = 0 and w2 = ∆I . From
Eq. (4.14) we obtain
Tr
(
∆O + w1
∆3I
)
= Tr
(
∆O + w2
∆3I
)
= 1,
which implies
Tr
(
∆O
∆3I
)
= 1 and Tr
(
∆I
∆3I
)
= Tr
(
1
∆2I
)
= Tr
(
1
∆I
)
= 0.
We proved that, if we want Eq.(4.13) to admit at least four solutions, which
would mean that x 7→ x3 is at least 4-differentially uniform with respect to
an operation ◦ such that d = n− 2, then we have to choose Ψ in such a way
that Tr ((uΨ)−1) = 0, where u is the non-null error in U◦. Notice that this
argument can be generalised to other APN quadratic functions and illustrate
that differential uniformity with respect to another operation is influenced
by the chosen correspondence Ψ.
Remark 4.5.5. We can also show that in the case where U◦ = {0, α} and
∆I /∈ W◦, some necessary conditions for 8-differential uniformity are
Tr
(
α
∆3I
)
= Tr
(
α
(∆I + α)3
)
= 0.
Indeed, proceeding as in Proposition 4.5.4, in this case we obtain that x is a
solution of Eq.(4.12) if and only if(
x
∆I
)2
+
x
∆I
= 1 +
∆O + w
(∆I + u)3
,
where u = ux,∆I and w = wx3,(x+∆I)3 , which implies
Tr
(
∆O + w
(∆I + u)3
)
= 1. (4.15)
Reasoning as in Proposition 4.5.4, if Eq.(4.12) admits eight solution of the
kind xi, xi+ ∆I for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, then the corresponding (ui, wi) ∈ {0, α}2 must
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be all different. The four cases are given in the following table:
Case u w Condition
1 0 0 Tr
(
∆O
∆3I
)
= 1
2 0 α Tr
(
∆O + α
(∆I + α)3
)
= 1
3 α 0 Tr
(
∆O
(∆I + α)3
)
= 1
4 α α Tr
(
(∆O + α)
(∆I + α)3
)
= 1
If the conditions in the four cases of the table are fulfilled, combining to-
gether Case 1 and Case 2, and Case 3 and Case 4, we obtain some necessary
conditions for max∆O DDT
◦ [∆I ,∆O] = 8:
Tr
(
α
∆3I
)
= Tr
(
α
(∆I + α)3
)
= 0.
The method described above has been used to build the S-box γ′ of Exam-
ple 4.5.1, where we choose Ψ with the property Tr ((e3Ψ)
−1) = 0. Moreover,
in this case, we computationally proved, using MAGMA, the following result
on x 7→ x3 on (F2)3.
Proposition 4.5.6. The function x 7→ x3 on (F2)3 is APN with respect to
 if and only if Ψ is such that Tr ((e3Ψ)−1) = 1 and it is 8-differentially
uniform with respect to  in the other case.
In this chapter we have defined the hypotheses which make operations
coming from alternative group of translations suitable for a differential at-
tack. As recalled in Section 1.2.1, three different layers define the round
functions of a SPN block cipher. In this chapter, we provided properties
selecting a subset of operations with a particular behavior with respect to
the key-addition and the confusion layer, considered singularly. We have
noticed that the magnitude of differential probabilities with respect to a dif-
ferent additive law on the message space may depend on a wise choice of
the parameters n and d which define the operation. In particular, in Theo-
rem 4.5.3 we proved that, if the size of U◦ is too small, we have less chances
to significantly weaken the non-linearity of the Boolean function considered.
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Even if the size U◦ depends on the relation between n and d, it is easy to
prove that U◦ is small when d ∼ n − 2 or d ∼ 1, i.e. when d is closer to
its lower or upper bound (see Theorem 4.4.5). On the other hand, by virtue
of Theorem 4.4.33, the cases d ∼ n − 2 or d ∼ 1 look the most convenient
since they allow ◦-differences to pass through the key-addition layer with the
highest probabilities. It may seems that a choice of n and d which is good
for the confusion layer is bad for the key-addition layer, and vice versa. This
should not surprise anyone: when n ∼ d, almost every vector is weak, i.e.
the operation + and ◦ are similar. In this case, since the confusion layer is
usually designed to maximise the non-linearity with respect to the XOR, we
cannot expect from an operation similar to + to induce differential probabil-
ities significantly different than the one induced by the XOR. However, all
the keys which are weak pass unharmed through the key-addition layer. The
same holds in the case d ∼ 1. Indeed, even if few vectors are weak, the size
of U◦ is small, hence no advantages in terms of non-linearity are obtained.
In the next chapter we will show how to find the correct balance between
n and d. Even if the previous considerations are correct, we are not taking
into account yet the hypothesis that the confusion layer is a parallel map.
Moreover, the choice of the parameter is also conditioned by another crucial
point which has been so far completely neglected: the impact of the diffu-
sion layer on ◦-differential probabilities. Indeed, to define an SPN with an
a priori weaker resistance to ◦-differential attack than +-differential attack,
we should also select an appropriate diffusion layer. The next chapter fo-
cuses on these aspects. In particular, in Section 5.1, we present some general
properties of the diffusion layer.
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5Designing a cipher
Our goal in this section is to first design an operation ◦, and then a cipher
that can be attacked using ◦-differentials. The attack can be successful if the
operation interacts with the layers of the chosen cipher in such a way that
◦ induces differential probabilities which are high enough to allow a distin-
guishing attack. However, if we want to show that our attack is meaningful,
we have also to show that such an attack fails it the attacker tries to use
ordinary differentials. Before putting things together, the way the diffusion
layer impacts on ◦-differential probabilities requires a careful study.
5.1 Interaction with the diffusion layer
In the previous chapter we refined our assumptions on operations ◦ in order
to obtain a higher differential uniformity of the S-boxes with respect to ◦
and possibly high probabilities induced by the key-addition layer. However,
we did not consider so far how ◦-differences propagate through the diffusion
layer, which is, in our model, a +-linear map. Notice that the role of the
diffusion layer, in the sense of keeping the cipher safe from differential at-
tacks, is to spread the differences as fast and as far as possible in the block,
i.e. to quickly activate as many S-boxes as possible. However, the diffusion
layer does not have a direct role in terms of differential probability when
differentials are computed with respect to the XOR, since it is a XOR-linear
map, and consequently each +-differential is deterministic over the diffusion
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layer. On the other hand though, in the case of ◦-differentials, a cryptana-
lyst willing to predict the output difference of the diffusion layer λ, given the
input ◦-difference ∆, needs to determine the distribution of the elements of
the kind of
xλ ◦ (x ◦∆)λ. (5.1)
knowing that, in general, λ is not linear with respect to ◦. The cryptanalyst
has to take into consideration that the n-bit linear map is then a huge ◦-non-
linear function with 2n inputs, which will make further analysis non-trivial.
Indeed, writing Eq. (5.1) in terms of the dot product, we obtain
xλ ◦ (x ◦∆)λ = ∆λ+ (x ·∆)λ+ xλ ·∆λ+ xλ · (x ·∆)λ,
which clearly depends on x ∈ (F2)n. This should be enough to convince the
reader that a successful attack with respect to an alternative operation ◦
may rely on the linearity of the diffusion layer also with respect to ◦.
5.1.1 Compatible diffusion layers
For the reason explained above, from now on we focus on operations ◦ and
on ciphers whose diffusion layer is an invertible matrix which is also ◦-linear.
Let us give a name to these functions.
Definition 5.1.1. Let ◦ be an operation as in Setting 3. We denote the
group of the homomorphisms of (V,+, ·) by H◦ def= Hom(V,+, ·). A matrix λ ∈
(F2)n×n is said to be compatible with the operation ◦ if λ ∈ H◦. Equivalently,
when λ is compatible with ◦, we also say that ◦ is compatible with λ.
Is not hard to prove that every map λ ∈ H◦ is linear with respect to +
and ◦, i.e. H◦ = GL(V,+) ∩GL(V, ◦).
Proposition 5.1.2. Let ◦ be an operation as in Setting 3 and let λ ∈ (F2)n×n
be compatible with ◦. Then λ ∈ GL(V, ◦).
Proof. Let a, b ∈ V . Then (a ◦ b)λ = aλ+ bλ+ (a · b)λ. Moreover, since λ is
compatible with ◦, (a · b)λ = aλ · bλ, hence it follows
(a ◦ b)λ = aλ+ bλ+ aλ · bλ = aλ ◦ bλ.
86
Interaction with the diffusion layer
The following result is useful to give a description of H◦.
Theorem 5.1.3. Let ◦ be an operation as in Setting 3, and let W◦ and U◦
be the weak-keys subspace and the set of errors respectively. Then, for each
λ ∈ H◦ it holds W◦λ = W◦ and U◦λ = U◦.
Proof. Let λ ∈ H◦ and let us prove that W◦λ = W◦. Let a ∈ W◦ and let
b ∈ V . Then
aλ ◦ bλ = (a ◦ b)λ = (a+ b)λ = aλ+ bλ,
which proves, being λ invertible, that aλ ∈ W◦, and consequently W◦λ = W◦.
On the other hand, if a ∈ U◦, then a = b · c for some b, c ∈ V . Then
aλ = (b · c)λ = bλ · cλ, hence aλ ∈ U◦.
The previous result is important since it gives a precise structure to the
matrices in H◦.
Lemma 5.1.4. Let ◦ be an operation. If λ ∈ (F2)n×n is compatible with ◦,
then for each a ∈ V it holds Maλ = λMaλ.
Proof. Let a, b ∈ V . Then, by Proposition 5.1.2, (b ◦ a)λ = bλ ◦ aλ, which
means that (bMa + a)λ = bλMaλ + aλ, i.e. bMaλ = bλMaλ. From the
generality of b, the desired follows.
Theorem 5.1.5. Let ◦ be an operation. If λ ∈ (F2)n×n is compatible with ◦,
then
λ =
(
A B
0
d,n−d D
)
,
where A ∈ GL ((F2)n−d,+), D ∈ GL ((F2)d,+), B ∈ (F2)(n−d)×d, and for
each a ∈ V it holds ΣaD = AΣaλ.
Proof. Let us write λ into the block form
λ =
(
A B
C D
)
.
Since, from Theorem 5.1.3, W◦λ = W◦ andW◦ is spanned by the last d vectors
of the canonical basis, it holds C = 0
d,n−d , and consequently A and D are
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invertible. Furthermore, for Lemma 5.1.4, for a ∈ V it holds Maλ = λMaλ.
This means that(
1n Σa
0
d,n−d 1d
)(
A B
0 D
)
=
(
A B
0 D
)(
1n Σaλ
0
d,n−d 1d
)
,
and consequently (
A B + ΣaD
0 D
)
=
(
A AΣaλ +B
0 D
)
.
It follows that
ΣaD = AΣaλ. (5.2)
Remark 5.1.6. Notice that λ is compatible with ◦ if the condition of
Eq. (5.2) is satisfied, regardless the choice of the matrix B. Indeed, when λ
is invertible, being an homomorphism of (V,+, ·) means that (a ·b)λ = aλ ·bλ
for each a and b, and such a condition relates only to weak vectors, which
are not influenced by B.
Theorem 5.1.5 and the previous lemma have been first proved and used
in [BCS17] to derive a polynomial-time algorithm which takes as input a
matrix λ ∈ (F2)n×n and returns an operation ◦ as in Setting 3 compatible
with λ. As an application, the authors show an example of operation which
is compatible with the diffusion layer of PRESENT. However, the output of
this algorithm is a huge1 class of operations which are too general for our
purpose. The main reason why we do not use here this algorithm is that
we experimentally noticed the best results in terms of the ratio between the
◦-differential uniformity and the +-differential uniformity of the confusion
layer when n is small. For this reason, we claim that the best operations for
a differential attack are obtained as a concatenation of smaller operations,
having the size of the S-boxes. We refer to these by saying parallel operations.
It is not clear if the output of the algorithm presented in [BCS17] contains
parallel operations. Since our main scope is to weaken the non-linearity
1In the case of PRESENT, the algorithm computes 22360 operations compatible with
the diffusion layer.
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of the confusion layer, we decide to prioritise the choice of the operation,
and consequently to focus on the opposite problem, i.e. given a convenient
parallel operation ◦, determine diffusion layers which are compatible with
◦. In the light of this, notice that Theorem 5.1.5 might impose a restriction
on the size of the weak-key space. For example, when d is such that n − d
exceeds the size of the S-boxes, the zero block in λ may prevent the layer
from having good diffusion properties. In the following section, we address
this problem in a case that, as we will show, represents the right compromise
between the dimension of the space and of the weak-key space, i.e. d = n−2.
5.2 The case d = n− 2
As we have seen in the previous chapter, unlike the standard differential
attack where only the confusion layer induces differential probabilities, in
the case of the attack with respect to different operations we also have to
consider the issues coming from the key-addition layer. In light of this, the
case where ◦-differential probabilities are the highest possible, in the sense
of Theorem 4.4.33, deserves particular attention. Let ◦ be any operation
such that d = dim(W◦) = n − 2. As we have shown in Section 4.4.4, every
operation with such hypotheses is individuated by a defining matrix of the
kind
Θ =
(
0 b
b 0
)
,
where b is any non-null vector in (F2)n−2. Consequently it holds
Me1 =
 12 0b
0n−2,2 1n−2
 , Me2 =
 12 b0
0n−2,2 1n−2
 ,
and Mei = 1n for each 3 ≤ i ≤ n. Notice that, in this case, U◦ is a subspace
and from Remark 4.4.24 it holds U◦ = Span{u}, where u = (0, 0, b) ∈ (F2)n.
Consequently, since U◦ contains only one non-null error, the output differ-
ence of the key-addition layer, when the input difference ∆ is given, is ∆ or
∆ + u, each one with probability 1/2. As we showed, as far as ◦-differential
passing through the key-addition layer and the corresponding probabilities
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are concerned, this is the best result we can obtain.
Let us now provide a characterisation of the matrices compatible with an
operation ◦ such that d = n − 2, i.e. a description of H◦. In the last part
of the chapter, this result will be useful for selecting a diffusion layer for the
illustration of our attack against a particular instance of SPN.
Theorem 5.2.1. Let ◦ be an operation as in Setting 3 and such that dim(W◦) =
n− 2, and let u = (0, 0, b) ∈ (F2)n be the generator of U◦. Let λ ∈ (F2)n×n.
The following are equivalent:
(i) λ is compatible with ◦;
(ii) there exist A ∈ GL ((F2)2,+), D ∈ GL ((F2)n−2,+), and B ∈ (F2)2×(n−2),
such that
λ =
(
A B
0n−2,2 D
)
and bD = b.
Proof. Firstly, from Theorem 5.1.5, λ decomposes into the block form
λ =
(
A B
0n−2,2 D
)
,
where A ∈ GL ((F2)2,+), D ∈ GL ((F2)n−2,+), B ∈ (F2)2×(n−d). From
Theorem 5.1.3, since U◦ = {0, u}, one obtains uλ = u, and hence bD = D.
Conversely, let us assume (ii) and prove that given x, y ∈ V it holds (x·y)λ =
xλ · yλ. If x ∈ W◦, then also xλ ∈ W◦, hence there is nothing to prove. For
the same reason (x · y)λ = xλ · yλ if and only if
((x1, x2, 0, . . . , 0) · (y1, y2, 0, . . . , 0))λ = (x1, x2, 0, . . . , 0)λ · (x1, x2, 0, . . . , 0)λ,
thus it is sufficient to consider the case x = e1 and y = e2. It is easy to check
that both the products e1 · e2 and e1λ · e2λ equal u, hence from uλ = u the
desired holds.
From Theorem 5.2.1 it also follows that the number of matrices compat-
ible with an operation ◦ of size n and such that d = n− 2 can be counted.
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Corollary 5.2.2. Let ◦ be an operation as in Setting 3 and such that dim(W◦) =
n− 2. Then
#H◦ = 3 · 23(n−2) ·# GL
(
(F2)n−3,+
)
,
where # GL ((F2)n−3,+) =
∏n−4
j=0 (2
n−3 − 2j).
Notice that in the present case, as we could have noticed by looking at the
table in Fig. 4.1, also the problem of counting the number of all the possible
operations is trivial. Since the number of operations equals the number of
all the possible defining matrices, it is straightforward that, when d = n− 2,
there exist 2n−2 − 1 alternative operations as is Assumpion 3 different from
the XOR.
5.3 Experiments on a small cipher
In this section we design a small cipher and we perform some experiments on
it, in order to show that the differential attack with an alternative operation
can be effective. Before doing this, it is worth spending some words on why
we decided for a small-size cipher and not for a standard one. As we already
pointed out in Section 4.5, having trails with larger probabilities with respect
to the operation ◦ than with respect to + represents a necessary condition
for the success of the distinguishing attack. However, this is not sufficient. In
fact, let us consider again Example 4.5.1. From one hand it is true that the
entries in DDT◦ are significantly larger of those in DDT+. The counterpart
is that the number of non-null entries in DDT+ is larger than those of DDT◦,
which means that, in the second case, for a given differential there may be
many more +-differential trails, even if with a lower probability. This might
result in a differential whose differential probability, obtained as the sum of
the probabilities of all its differential trails, is higher in the case of + than in
the one of ◦. In this sense, the role of the diffusion layer is crucial, since the
probability of any differential is the sum of the probabilities of all the trails
which compose the differential, and the number of such trails depends on the
good diffusion properties of the linear layer. It should be clear that, if we
want to prove that a given cipher is secure in the standard setting and not in
the one of ◦-differentials, a comparison between the best +-differential trail
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and the best ◦-differential trail may be rather inconclusive. For this reason,
we believe that the only possible approach is to perform an exhaustive search
for all the differentials, and to compare the values of the best +-differential
and of the best ◦-differential. The choice of a standard size for the block
would make these computations unfeasible.
From now on let us assume n = 15 and let us write V = ⊕5i=1(F2)3, i.e.
let us assume V is decomposed as the sum of five 3-dimensional bricks. We
will design shortly a 15-bit SPN having five identical 3-bit S-boxes. Before
doing this, let us describe the operation ◦ˆ we will be using for the attack.
5.3.1 The operation ◦ˆ
One particular operation between those discussed in Section 5.2 deserves
attention, i.e. the one obtained when b = (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ (F2)13, which is
defined by the matrices
Me1 =
 12 0 0 . . . 01 0 . . . 0
013,2 113
 , Me2 =
 12 1 0 . . . 00 0 . . . 0
013,2 113
 ,
and Mei = 115 for 3 ≤ i ≤ 15. The reason why we focus on this operation
is that ◦ˆ is a parallel operation with respect to the message space decom-
position V = ⊕5i=1(F2)3. In particular, it acts as the operation  defined
in Example 4.4.21 on the first brick, and as + on the remaining ones, i.e.
◦ˆ = (,+,+,+,+). For example, if x, y ∈ V
(x1, x2, x3, x4, . . . , x15)◦ˆ(y1, y2, y3, y4, . . . , y15)
= ((x1, x2, x3)  (y1, y2, y3), x4 + y4, . . . , x15 + y15).
In the case of the operation ◦ˆ, Theorem 5.2.1 becomes as follows.
Theorem 5.3.1. Let λ ∈ (F2)15×15. The following are equivalent:
(i) λ ∈ H◦ˆ;
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λ =

1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0

Figure 5.1: A diffusion layer compatible with ◦ˆ
(ii) there exist A ∈ GL ((F2)2,+), D ′ ∈ GL ((F2)12,+), B ∈ (F2)2×13 and
B ′ ∈ (F2)12×1 such that
λ =
 A B
013,2
1 01,12
B ′ D ′
 .
Example 5.3.2. From Theorem 5.3.1, the 15×15 binary matrix λ displayed
in Fig. 5.1 is compatible with ◦ˆ. Notice that, when used with a parallel
confusion layer featuring 3-bit S-boxes, the zero block 013,2 does not represent
a weakness.
5.3.2 The target cipher
Let us consider the R-round SPN defined by classical round functions of the
type εi,K = γλσki , where γ acts on every brick as the S-box γ
′ defined in
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Figure 5.2: 1-round encryption of the 15-bit target cipher
Example 4.5.1 and λ is the matrix of Fig. 5.1. In Fig 5.2 a 1-round encryption
of our target cipher is displayed. Recalling that the operation  is suitable
for attacking the cubic S-box of Example 4.5.1, which we have chosen as
S-box for our cipher, and that the operation ◦ˆ behaves as the XOR from the
4th bit of the block onwards, we are basically performing an attack against
the first S-box of the cipher, whose differential properties with respect to ◦ˆ
are weaker, as already shown in Example 4.5.1. On the other hand, recall
that the values in the DDTγ′ need to be rescaled, due to the effect of the
further -differential probabilities induced by the key-addition layer. What
we show next is that the magnitude difference between the entries of the two
DDTs is sufficiently large for a distinguishing attack, despite the effect of the
key-addition.
5.3.3 Results and conclusions
For the cipher of Section 5.3.2, we have performed experiments to study
its resistance to differential cryptanalysis. Note that only the resistance
to differential cryptanalysis is considered and we do not claim any other
resistance criteria for the security of this small cipher.
Setting the attack We did not specify yet how we generate the key used
for the attack. As it has been discussed in [DR07] and [BG10], the proba-
94
Experiments on a small cipher
bility of a differential trail may depend on the choice of the master key used
to encrypt the messages. In order to take this fact into account, we generate
a key-schedule by selecting the round keys ki’s uniformly at random in V ,
for each master key, i.e. we are considering the cipher as a long-key cipher.
Moreover, in our computation we considered 211 possible key-schedule sam-
ples, in order to have a good estimate of the expected differential probability
of the best differential on r rounds of the cipher. We computed by means
of an exhaustive search all the possible differentials, for each possible key
assignment, and furthermore considered the average of the obtained results.
Let us now discuss the results obtained when r = 5.
A simulation of the attack on 5 rounds The experimental computa-
tions show that the best 5-round differential (∆I+ ,∆O+) = (0007x, 1301x)
occurs with probability 2−14.567 where the difference taken into consideration
is the classical +-difference. Using the operation ◦ˆ of Section 5.3.1 instead,
the best 5-round differential is (∆I◦ˆ ,∆O◦ˆ) = (3000x, 019Dx) with probability
2−14.296. Let now DIST be an algorithm intended to distinguish the 5-round
cipher from a random permutation, and let ORACLE be an encryption oracle.
Consider the following games.
Procedure 1 Game 1
1: DIST computes P
def
= [(x, x+ ∆I+)| x ∈ V ]
2: ORACLE select uniformly at random α ∈ {0, 1}
3: if α = 1 then
4: ORACLE picks a random key K and returns
C
def
= [aEK + bEK | (a, b) ∈ P ]
5: else ORACLE returns a list C of #P elements chosen uniformly at random
in V
6: if ∆O+ ∈ C then
7: DIST returns 1
8: else DIST returns 0
We can compute the maximal success probability of the distinguishing attack
as the probability that at least one pair (x, x + ∆I+) or (x, x◦ˆ∆I◦ˆ) follows
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Procedure 2 Game 2
1: DIST computes P
def
= [(x, x◦ˆ∆I◦ˆ)| x ∈ V ]
2: ORACLE select uniformly at random α ∈ {0, 1}
3: if α = 1 then
4: ORACLE picks a random key K and returns
C
def
= [aEK ◦ˆ bEK | (a, b) ∈ P ]
5: else ORACLE returns a list C of #P elements chosen uniformly at random
in V
6: if ∆O◦ˆ ∈ C then
7: DIST returns 1
8: else DIST returns 0
the differential, assuming that, when using the full codebook, differentials
are binomially distributed over the keys [DR07]. Hence, letting the success
probability of the algorithm DIST with respect to Game 1 and Game 2 be
defined respectively as
S iDIST def= P(DIST = 1| α = 1), i ∈ {1, 2},
we obtain that if S1DIST > 1/2 or S2DIST > 1/2, then DIST manages to distin-
guish the 5-round cipher from a random permutation using +-differences or
◦ˆ-differences, respectively. With the probabilities previously given, we find
that in more than 50% of the cases the differential is not fulfilled for the
+-difference and we can conclude that a basic distinguishing attack does not
succeed. In the same setting using the ◦ˆ-differences, the differential appears
at least once for about 56% of the keys.
Consequently this represents an example of a small cipher which looks
like a classically secure SPN, and for which considering an operation dif-
ferent from the one used for the key-addition produces a successful distin-
guishing attack. This may also be rephrased in another way: a designer
may be tempted to claim that a 5-round encryption is sufficient to grant
security from differential cryptanalysis to the cipher. The designer would
not be wrong since we proved that, considering only classical differences, the
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distinguishing attack fails. However, a cryptanalyst using ◦ˆ-differentials may
succeed in breaking the 5-round cipher. Therefore, an R-round encryption
with R > 5 is required to provide security with respect to the differential
attack with a more general class of operations.
While at the time of writing the impact of the key addition is well un-
derstood, the question of searching large-scale diffusion layers and of under-
standing the impact of the new operations on the differential uniformity of
classical S-boxes remains open.
In conclusion, we proved that a cipher which appears to be secure with
respect to the classical differential attack may be actually weak with respect
to a differential attack where the difference used comes from another group
operation on the message space. We essentially showed that, depending
on the operation considered, a cipher can have different levels of resistance
against differential attacks. Considering the class of effectively computable
operations introduced in [CS17], we studied the interaction between the latter
and the layers of a SPN, and designed operations which made our differential
attack possible. We finally provided an example of a 15-bit SPN which cannot
be distinguished from a random permutation in the classical context, whereas
a distinguishing attack succeeds when considering ◦ˆ-differences, where ◦ˆ is
an operation built ad hoc for the purpose.
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On the design of wave ciphers
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6On wave functions
The last part of this thesis is devoted to the design and the study of the alge-
braic security of wave ciphers, a family of Feistel Networks which is described
in this chapter.
6.1 Overview and motivation
Let us recall that we are considering two families of symmetric cryptosystems,
namely Substitution-Permutation Networks and Feistel Networks, which are
obtained as a composition of several round functions. Each round function
is a key-dependent permutation of the plaintext space, designed in a way
to provide both confusion and diffusion. Confusion is provided by means of
a non-linear layer which applies vectorial Boolean functions, called S-boxes,
whereas a linear map, called diffusion layer, provides diffusion. In order to
perform decryption, invertible layers and the Feistel structure are used in
SPN and FN, respectively. In the framework of SPNs decryption is per-
formed applying in reverse order the inverse of each layer of the cipher. In
the case of FNs, it is the Feistel structure itself to guarantee a fast decryption.
It is well-established that the non-linearity of the confusion layer is a cru-
cial parameter for the security of the cipher. In particular, in order to prevent
statistical attacks (e.g. differential [BS91a] and linear [Mat93] cryptanaly-
sis), block ciphers’ designers are interested in invertible S-boxes reaching the
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best possible differential uniformity, which is two. Functions satisfying such
property, i.e. almost-perfect non-linear functions (see Definition 2.4.7), are
extensively studied. However, as recalled in Section 2.4.2, no APN permu-
tation is known in the cases s ∈ {4, 8}, which for implementation needs
represent the optimal sizes of an S-box. For this reason, in this part of the
thesis we focus on defining a new framework for block ciphers, whose S-boxes
are not bijective, and consequently can be APN functions with s inputs, s
even. More precisely, we focus on injective confusion layers which enlarge
the message, and on surjective diffusion layers which reduce the message to
its original size. By appending a key addition to these, we obtain a gener-
alised round function which we call a wave function. Consequently a wave
cipher is a block cipher featuring wave functions in its structure. In order
to guarantee an efficient decryption, we propose to use wave functions inside
an FN-like framework. As far as the security of wave ciphers is concerned,
we focus on a group-theoretical analysis, giving sufficient conditions for the
primitivity of the group generated by the round functions (see Chapter 3).
Recall that the cryptanalysts’ interest into the imprimitivity of the group
generated by the round functions of a block cipher arises from the study
performed by Paterson [Pat99], who showed how the imprimitivity of the
group can be exploited to construct a trapdoor that may be hard to detect.
In particular, he gave an example of a DES-like cipher, which can be easily
broken since its round functions generate an imprimitive group, but which
is resistant to both linear and differential cryptanalysis. In this part, we
show that ciphers having such a wave structure are provably secure, under
some cryptographic assumptions, with respect to the imprimitivity attack
described in Section 3.3. It is worth mentioning here that, in order to prove
the security of a given wave cipher with respect to other classical statistical
attacks (e.g. linear and differential cryptanalysis), it is needed to analyse the
single instance under consideration.
6.2 Wave ciphers
The aim of this section is to define ciphers whose inner layers are not nec-
essarily invertible, which allow to use APN vectorial Boolean functions as
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Figure 6.1: Wave functions
S-boxes, even when the S-box input size is four or eight. We focus on the
case of wave-shaped round functions, which feature a first layer which en-
larges the state, a second which reduces its size, and a key addition. These
round functions are employed in the place of classical round functions for
both SPNs and FNs. To do so, let us define an auxiliary space W = (F2)m,
with n ≤ m such that dim(W ) = m = bt and W = W1⊕W2⊕ . . .⊕Wb. The
subspaces Wjs are also called bricks of W .
What follows is a generalisation of the concept of classical round function
given in Definition 1.3.1.
Definition 6.2.1. For each k ∈ V , a wave function induced by k is a map
εk : V → V of the type εk = γλσk, where
• γ : V → W is an injective non-linear transformation (parallel S-box)
which acts in a parallel way on each Vj, i.e.
(x1, x2, . . . , xn)γ =
(
(x1, . . . , xs)γ1, . . . , (xs(b−1)+1, . . . , xn)γb
)
.
The maps γj : Vj → Wj are called S-boxes;
• λ : W → V is a surjective linear map;
• σk : V → V, x 7→ x+ k is the round key addition.
Figure 6.1 depicts the composition of two consecutive wave functions.
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Notice that, in general, we do not require that a wave function is invert-
ible. However, if it is necessary, the following result gives a condition on
the confusion and diffusion layers which ensures that a wave function is a
permutation.
Lemma 6.2.2. Let εk = γλσk be a wave function. The following are equiv-
alent:
(i) {a+ b | a, b ∈ Im γ} ∩Kerλ = {0};
(ii) εk ∈ Sym(V ).
Proof. Let us assume (i). Let x1, x2 ∈ V such that x1εk = x2εk. Then
(x1γ + x2γ)λ = 0, so x1γ + x2γ ∈ {a + b | a, b ∈ Im γ} ∩ Kerλ = {0}, and
hence x1γ = x2γ. Since γ is injective, it follows x1 = x2. Conversely, let
x ∈ {a + b | a, b ∈ Im γ} ∩ Kerλ. Then there exist x1, x2 ∈ V such that
x = x1γ + x2γ and xλ = 0, that is x1γλ = x2γλ. Therefore x1εk = x2εk and
hence x1 = x2, which implies x = 0.
Remark 6.2.3. Notice that it always holds 0 ∈ {a+ b | a, b ∈ Im γ}∩Kerλ.
Moreover, notice that if we assume that 0γ = 0, then the first condition of
the previous lemma implies that Im γ ∩Kerλ = {0}.
6.2.1 Feistel Networks with wave functions
Since our goal is to use the previously defined wave functions inside a cipher,
we now define a wave cipher as an FN whose F-function is a wave function.
Feistel Network’s straightforward decryption encourages this choice.
Before defining wave ciphers, we generalise the security requirement of
proper and strongly proper diffusion layers (see Definition 2.4.13 and Defini-
tion 2.4.14) to the case of surjective maps. Let us also recall that a wall of
V (resp. W) is any non-trivial and proper sum of bricks of V (resp. W ).
Definition 6.2.4. A surjective linear transformation λ : W −→ V is a proper
diffusion layer if for each wall W ′ =
⊕
j∈JWj of W and V
′ =
⊕
j∈J Vj of V ,
where ∅ 6= J ⊂ {1, . . . , b}, it holds
V ′λ−1 6⊂ W ′ + Kerλ.
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In other terms, if pi : W −→ W/Kerλ is the canonical projection of W onto
W/Ker(λ), and λˆ : W/Kerλ→ V is such that w + Kerλ 7→ wλ, λ is proper
in the sense of Definition 6.2.4 if there exists no wall W ′ =
⊕
j∈JWj of W
and V ′ =
⊕
j∈J Vj of V such that W
′piλˆ = V ′, i.e. no wall of W is sent by
piλˆ into a wall of V .
We are now ready to give the definition of a wave cipher, which involves
the notion of Feistel operator already explained in Definition 1.2.4.
Definition 6.2.5. An R-round wave cipher Φ is a family of encryption func-
tions {EK | K ∈ K} ⊆ Sym(V × V ) such that for each K ∈ K the map EK
is the composition of R functions. More precisely EK = ε1,K ε2,K . . . εR,K ,
where εi,K = γλσki is an n-bit wave function such that
• λ is a proper diffusion layer, in the sense of Definition 6.2.4,
• the key-schedule K → V R, K 7→ (k1, k2, . . . , kR), is surjective with
respect to any brick.
The function ρ
def
= γλ is called the generating function of the wave cipher.
Let us notice that the ciphers previously introduced are FNs featuring a
wave function as F-function. Indeed, given (x1, x2) ∈ V × V one has
(x1, x2)εi,K = (x1, x2)
(
0n 1n
1n εi,K
)
= (x2, x1 + x2εi,K),
where the operator εi,K induces the Feistel structure, as shown in Figure 6.2.
Moreover εi,K is invertible with the following inverse
εi,K
−1 =
(
εi,K 1n
1n 0n
)
.
Note that, as for any FN, the inverse εi,K
−1 of the round function εi,K does
not involve the inverse of the wave function εi,K .
103
Wave ciphers
Figure 6.2: Feistel structure of wave ciphers
6.2.2 The group generated by the rounds of a wave
cipher
Let T(0,n)
def
= {σ(0,k) | (x1, x2) 7→ (x1, x2 + k)} < Sym(V × V ). Let ρ be
the generating function of a wave cipher Φ, and ρ the corresponding Feistel
operator
ρ =
(
0n 1n
1n ρ
)
.
Then εi,K = ρ σ(0,ki), and so 〈T(0,n), ρ 〉 is the group generated by the round
functions of the wave cipher Φ.
Remark 6.2.6. It is worth noting here that 〈T(0,n), ρ 〉 is well defined even
if ρ is not a permutation. However, the strategy we adopt in the following
chapter to prove the primitivity of the group under consideration requires
the assumption that ρ is invertible.
The study of the group 〈T(0,n), ρ 〉 previously defined is the subject of the
next chapter, where we determine conditions ensuring that such a group is
primitive.
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In this last chapter, we first show a group-theoretical result which, as con-
sequence, links the primitivity for a Substitution-Permutation Network and
the primitivity for a Feistel Network having respectively round functions and
F-functions with the same structure. By exploiting this result we prove that
the group generated by the round functions of a wave cipher is primitive
under some reasonable cryptographic assumptions on the underlying wave
functions.
7.1 Security reduction
Let us consider the group generated by the rounds of an FN which uses as
F-functions the round functions of a primitive SPN. Here we prove a group-
theoretical result which implies the primitivity of the group under consider-
ation. In particular this result is used to show that the group generated by
the round functions of a wave cipher with an invertible generating function
is primitive if the group1 generated by the round functions of an SPN-like
cipher having as round functions the same wave functions is primitive, as
depicted in Fig. 7.1.
1Note that the hypothesis that the wave functions are invertible allows to consider this
group.
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Figure 7.1: FN to SPN reduction
Let us recall that
• Tn = {σk | x 7→ x+ k} < Sym(V ),
• T(0,n) = {σ(0,k) | (x1, x2) 7→ (x1, x2 + k)} < Sym(V × V ),
and let us define
• T(n,0) def= {σ(k,0) | (x1, x2) 7→ (x1 + k, x2)} < Sym(V × V ),
• T(n,n) def= {σ(k1,k2) | (x1, x2) 7→ (x1 + k1, x2 + k2)} < Sym(V × V ).
Notice that Tn ∼= T(0,n) ∼= T(n,0) < T(n,n).
Let ρ be any element in Sym(V ), ρ be the corresponding Feistel operator,
and let Γ
def
= 〈T(0,n), ρ 〉. Since we aim at characterising imprimitivity blocks
for Γ using Lemma 3.3.2 and Lemma 3.3.3, we need to individuate a transitive
subgroup of Γ. For this reason, the following alternative presentation of Γ is
useful.
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Lemma 7.1.1. Γ = 〈T(n,n), ρ 〉.
Proof. Obviously Γ = 〈T(0,n), ρ 〉 < 〈T(n,n), ρ 〉. On the other hand, given
x1, x2, k ∈ V one has
(x1, x2)ρσ(0,k) =(x1, x2)
(
0n 1n
1n ρ
)
σ(0,k)
=(x2, x1 + x2ρ+ k)
=(x1 + k, x2)
(
0n 1n
1n ρ
)
=(x1, x2)σ(k,0)ρ.
Hence for each k ∈ V it holds ρσ(0,k) = σ(k,0)ρ, and consequently σ(k,0) ∈ Γ.
Therefore for each k1, k2 ∈ V , σ(k1,k2) = σ(k1,0)σ(0,k2) ∈ Γ.
Being T(n,n) a transitive subgroup of Γ and noticing that the subgroups
of T(n,n) are of the form {σu : u ∈ U}, where U is a subgroup of V × V , we
obtain the following.
Lemma 7.1.2. If Γ is imprimivitive in its action on V × V , then a block
system is made of the cosets of a subgroup of V × V , i.e. it is
{U + v | v ∈ V × V },
where U is a non-trivial and proper subgroup of V × V .
Proof. See Lemma 3.3.2 and Lemma 3.3.3.
According to Lemma 7.1.2, in order to prove that Γ is primitive it is
sufficient to prove that no subgroup of V × V is a block. The following
theorem, known as Goursat’s Lemma [Gou89], characterises the subgroups
of the direct product of two groups in terms of suitable sections of the direct
factors (see also [Pet09]). We apply this result to the additive group V × V .
Theorem 7.1.3. Let G1 and G2 be two groups. There exists a bijection
between
1. the set of all subgroups of the direct product G1 ×G2, and
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2. the set of all triples (A/B,C/D, ψ), where
• A is a subgroup of G1,
• C is a subgroup of G2,
• B is a normal subgroup of A,
• D is a normal subgroup of C, and
• ψ : A/B → C/D is a group isomorphism.
In this bijection, each subgroup of G1 ×G2 can be uniquely written as
Uψ = {(a, c) ∈ A× C : (a+B)ψ = c+D}.
Note that the isomorphism ψ : A/B → C/D is induced by a homomorphism
ϕ : A→ C such that (a+B)ψ = aϕ+D for any a ∈ A, and Bϕ ≤ D. Such
homomorphism is not unique.
Lemma 7.1.4. In the above notation, given any homomorphism ϕ inducing
ψ, we have
Uψ = {(a, aϕ+ d) : a ∈ A, d ∈ D}. (7.1)
Proof. Note first that the right-hand side of Eq. (7.1) is contained in Uψ,
since for a ∈ A and d ∈ D we have (a + B)ψ = aϕ + D = aϕ + d + D,
that is, (a, aϕ + d) ∈ Uψ. Moreover Uψ is contained in the right-hand side
of Eq. (7.1). Indeed, if (a, c) ∈ Uψ we have aϕ + D = (a + B)ψ = c + D, so
that c = aϕ+ d for some d ∈ D.
This is our main result of this section.
Theorem 7.1.5. Let ρ ∈ Sym(V ) \ AGL(V ), let ρ be the corresponding
Feistel operator, and denote by Γ = 〈Tn, ρ 〉 and by Γ =
〈
T(0,n), ρ
〉
. If Γ is
primitive on V , then Γ is primitive on V × V .
Before proving Theorem 7.1.5, we show how this group-theoretical result can
be helpful to us. Let Φ = {EK | K ∈ K} ⊆ Sym(V ×V ) be an R-round wave
cipher. Denoting by ρ
def
= γλ its generating function, one has, as shown in
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Section 6.2.2, that Γ∞(Φ) = 〈T(0,n), ρ 〉 is the group generated by the round
functions of the wave cipher Φ. Moreover, 〈Tn, ρ 〉 is the group generated by
the wave-shaped round functions of an SPN-like cipher whose round functions
are εi,K = ρ σki . Therefore, from Theorem 7.1.5, next result directly follows.
Corollary 7.1.6. Let Φ be a wave cipher, let ρ ∈ Sym(V ) its generating
function and ρ the Feistel operator induced by ρ. If 〈Tn, ρ 〉 is primitive on
V , then Γ∞(Φ) = 〈T(0,n), ρ 〉 is primitive on V × V .
Proof of Theorem 7.1.5. Let us suppose that Γ =
〈
T(0,n), ρ
〉
=
〈
T(n,n), ρ
〉
is
imprimitive, so there exists a non-trivial and proper subgroup U of V ×V =
(F2)n × (F2)n such that {U + (v1, v2) | (v1, v2) ∈ V × V } is a block system.
In particular,
Uρ = U + (v1, v2) (7.2)
for some (v1, v2) ∈ V × V . Since (0, 0)ρ = (0, 0ρ), we can assume v1 = 0
and v2 = 0ρ. With reference to Lemma 7.1.4 and its notation, we have
U = {(a, aϕ+ d) | a ∈ A, d ∈ D}, and by Eq. (7.2), for any a ∈ A and d ∈ D
there exist x ∈ A and y ∈ D such that
(a, aϕ+ d)
(
0n 1n
1n ρ
)
= (x, xϕ+ y + 0ρ),
that is
(aϕ+ d, a+ (aϕ+ d)ρ) = (x, xϕ+ y + 0ρ).
Hence, it holds x = aϕ + d, and considering a = 0, we obtain D ≤ A.
Otherwise, considering d = 0, we obtain Aϕ ≤ A. Similarly, we have
Uρ−1 = U + (v′1, v
′
2) (7.3)
for some (v′1, v
′
2) ∈ V × V . Since ρ−1 =
(
ρ 1n
1n 0n
)
, we can consider v′1 = 0ρ
and v′2 = 0. In this case, for any a ∈ A and d ∈ D there exist x ∈ A and
y ∈ D such that
(aρ+ aϕ+ d, a) = (x+ 0ρ, xϕ+ y).
Hence we have x = aρ+ aϕ+ d+ 0ρ. Substituting x = aϕ+ d in xϕ+ y and
being ϕ a homomorphism, it holds y = a + aρϕ + aϕ2 + dϕ + 0ρϕ. Then,
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considering a = 0, we obtain y = dϕ, and thus Dϕ ≤ D. Now, in the general
case, letting (v1, v2) ∈ V × V it holds
(U + (v1, v2))ρ = U + (v
′
1, v
′
2) (7.4)
for some (v′1, v
′
2) ∈ V × V . By definition of ρ, we can take v′1 = v2 and
v′2 = v1 + v2ρ. By Lemma 7.1.4 and by Eq. (7.4), for any a ∈ A and d ∈ D
there exist x ∈ A and y ∈ D such that
(a+ v1, aϕ+ d+ v2)
(
0n 1n
1n ρ
)
= (x+ v2, xϕ+ y + v1 + v2ρ),
that is,
(aϕ+ d+ v2, a+ v1 + (aϕ+ d+ v2)ρ) = (x+ v2, xϕ+ y + v1 + v2ρ),
hence we have x = aϕ+ d. Substituting x = aϕ+ d in xϕ+ y + v1 + v2ρ,
a+ v1 + (aϕ+ d+ v2)ρ+ aϕ
2 + v1 + v2ρ = y + dϕ.
Then, considering a = 0, we obtain (d+ v2)ρ = y+dϕ+ v2ρ. Since Dϕ ≤ D,
then y + dϕ ∈ D and so
(D + v2)ρ = D + v2ρ.
Note that we obtain the equality since ρ is a permutation. If D 6= {0}, (F2)n,
then we proved that the imprimitivity of Γ implies the imprimitivity of Γ. To
complete the proof, it remains to consider the cases D = (F2)n and D = {0}.
[D = (F2)n] We proved that D ≤ A, and from the hypotheses holds that
D ≤ C and ψ is an isomorphism between A/B and C/D. Since D = (F2)n,
we have D = C = A = B = (F2)n, which contradicts that U is a proper
subgroup of V × V .
[D = {0}] First, note that in this case Bϕ = {0}. Moreover, by Lemma
7.1.4,
U = {(a, aϕ) | a ∈ A},
and by Eq. (7.4) for any a ∈ A there exists x ∈ A such that
(aϕ+ v2, a+ v1 + (aϕ+ v2)ρ) = (x+ v2, xϕ+ v1 + v2ρ).
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Proceedings as before, it holds
a+ aϕ2 = (aϕ+ v2)ρ+ v2ρ. (7.5)
Note that for any a ∈ B ≤ A, aϕ = 0 and so we obtain a + v2ρ = v2ρ for
any a ∈ B, that is, B = {0}. Therefore, if D = {0}, also B = {0} and so
ϕ = ψ is an isomorphism between A and C. Moreover, since Aϕ is contained
in both A and C, then A = C and ϕ is an automorphism of A. If A = {0},
then A = C = D = B = {0}, which contradicts that U is non-trivial. If A
is a proper subgroup of (F2)n, then by Eq. (7.5) and since both a+ aϕ2 and
aϕ belong to A we have
(A+ v2)ρ = A+ v2ρ,
and so Γ is imprimitive. If A = (F2)n, in Eq. (7.5) we can consider v2 = 0
since aϕ+ v2 is an element of A = (F2)n, so we have
(aϕ)ρ = a+ aϕ2 + 0ρ.
Since the function x+ xϕ2 is linear, we proved that ρ ∈ AGL(V ), which is a
contradiction.
7.2 Conditions on SPN-like wave ciphers
In the light of Theorem 7.1.5, given a wave cipher Φ whose generating func-
tion ρ is invertible, we obtain that the group Γ∞(Φ) is primitive if we manage
to prove that the group 〈Tn, ρ 〉 is primitive. The latter represents the group
generated by the rounds of an SPN-like cipher featuring wave functions in
the place of classical round functions. Although for such a cipher it may be
difficult to compute the computational inverse of the encryption functions,
since it has an SPN structure with non-invertible layers, we can still study
its theoretical properties. In this section we underline which properties of
the generating function ρ guarantee that 〈Tn, ρ 〉 is primitive. From now on
let us assume that ρ ∈ Sym(V ).
Let ρ = γλ be the generating function of a wave cipher. From now on we
also assume that γ maps 0 to 0, since it is always possible to add 0γ to the
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round key of the previous round. Then, since λ is linear, it holds 0ρ = 0.
In the following, we give a generalisation of Definition 2.4.10, which is a
condition in our second main theorem. Let us recall that, as in Section 6.2,
V = V1 ⊕ V2 ⊕ . . .⊕ Vb and W = W1 ⊕W2 ⊕ . . .⊕Wb, with Vj = (F2)s and
Wj = (F2)t for each 1 ≤ j ≤ b.
Definition 7.2.1. Let 1 ≤ j ≤ b, γj : Vj → Wj be an S-box such that
0γj = 0, and λ : W → V be a surjective linear map. Given 0 ≤ δ < s, γj
is δ-non-invariant with respect to λ if for any proper subspaces V ′ < Vj and
W ′ < Wj such that V ′γj + Kerλ ∩Wj = W ′, then dim(W ′) < s− δ.
Notice that if 0 ≤ δ < δ′ < s and γj is δ′-non-invariant with respect to λ,
then it is also δ-non-invariant with respect to λ.
Lemma 7.2.2. Let ρ = γλ ∈ Sym(V ) be the generating function of a wave
cipher. Then 〈Tn, ρ 〉 is imprimitive if and only if there exists a proper and
non-trivial subgroup U of V such that (u+ v)γ + vγ ∈ Uλ−1, for any u ∈ U
and v ∈ V . In this case, {U + v | v ∈ V } is a block system for 〈Tn, ρ 〉.
Proof. Since Tn ≤ 〈Tn, ρ 〉, if 〈Tn, ρ 〉 is imprimitive, then {U + v | v ∈ V } is
a block system, for some proper and non-trivial subgroup U of V . Let v ∈ V ,
then (U + v)ρ = U + vρ = U + vγλ. Therefore for any u ∈ U and v ∈ V it
holds (u+ v)γλ+ vγλ ∈ U and, since λ is linear, (u+ v)γ + vγ ∈ Uλ−1.
The following is the main result of this section.
Theorem 7.2.3. Let ρ = γλ ∈ Sym(V ) be the generating function of a wave
cipher Φ. If
(i) there exists 1 ≤ δ < s such that for each 1 ≤ j ≤ b the S-box γj is
• 2δ-differentially uniform,
• δ-non-invariant with respect to λ,
(ii) Kerλ =
⊕b
j=1 Kerλ ∩Wj (λ has a parallel kernel),
then 〈Tn, ρ〉 is primitive (and so it is Γ∞(Φ)).
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Proof. Suppose that 〈Tn, ρ〉 is imprimitive. For Lemma 7.2.2, a block system
is of the form {U + v | v ∈ V }, for any proper and non-trivial subgroup U of
V . Since U is an imprimitivity block and ρ ∈ 〈Tn, ρ〉, Uρ = U + v for some
v ∈ V . Moreover, since 0ρ = 0, we obtain U + v = U , and consequently
Uρ = Uγλ = U. Moreover
Uγ + Kerλ = Uλ−1 ⊆ W, (7.6)
and so Uγ + Kerλ is a subspace of W . For 1 ≤ j ≤ b, let pij : V −→ Vj
be the j-th projection with respect to the decomposition V = V1 ⊕ . . .⊕ Vb,
and I
def
= { j | j ∈ {1, . . . , b}, Upij 6= {0}}. Then two cases are possible: either
U ∩ Vj = Vj for each j ∈ I, or there exists j ∈ I such that U ∩ Vj 6= Vj.
In the first case U =
⊕
j∈I Vj is a wall. From Eq. (7.6) it holds(⊕
j∈I
Vj
)
γ + Kerλ =
(⊕
j∈I
Vj
)
λ−1. (7.7)
Since γ is a parallel transformation, we have(⊕
j∈I
Vj
)
γ ⊂
⊕
j∈I
Wj. (7.8)
Thus, from Eq. (7.7) and Eq. (7.8) it follows that(⊕
j∈I
Vj
)
λ−1 ⊂
⊕
j∈I
Wj + Kerλ,
which is a contradiction since λ is proper, in the sense of Definition 6.2.4.
In the second case, let us assume there exists j ∈ I such that U ∩Vj 6= Vj.
From Eq. (7.6) we have
(Uγ + Kerλ) ∩Wj = Uλ−1 ∩Wj, (7.9)
where, since both γ and Ker(λ) are parallel by definition of γ and for (ii),
(Uγ+Kerλ)∩Wj = Uγ∩Wj+Kerλ∩Wj = (U ∩Vj)γj+Kerλ∩Wj. (7.10)
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Indeed, let u = (u1γ1, u2γ2, . . . , ubγb) ∈ Uγ, v = (v1, v2, . . . , vb) ∈ Kerλ,
and let us assume that w
def
= uγ + v ∈ (Uγ + Kerλ) ∩ Wj, hence w =
(0, . . . , 0, wj, 0, . . . , 0). For l 6= j we obtain ulγl = vl, hence vl ∈ Im γl ∩
(Kerλ∩Wl). From Remark 6.2.3 and since Kerλ is parallel, we have Im γl ∩
(Kerλ ∩Wl) = {0}, therefore vl = ul = 0. Thus, Eq. (7.9) and Eq. (7.10)
imply that
(U ∩ Vj)γj + Kerλ ∩Wj = Uλ−1 ∩Wj,
and, since γj is δ-non-invariant with respect to λ, then
dim (Uλ−1 ∩Wj) < s− δ. (7.11)
Furthermore, let u ∈ U such that uj def= upij 6= 0 and vj ∈ Vj. Since 〈Tn, ρ 〉 is
imprimitive, by Lemma 7.2.2 it follows that (u+vj)γ+vjγ ∈ Uλ−1. Moreover
uγ ∈ Uγ ⊂ Uλ−1, and so uγ + (u + vj)γ + vjγ ∈ Uλ−1, whose components
are null, except possibly for those of the j-th brick, i.e.
ujγj + (uj + vj)γj + vjγj ∈ Uλ−1 ∩Wj, (7.12)
which implies that Im(γˆjuj ) + ujγj ⊂ Uλ−1 ∩Wj. Being γj 2δ-differentially
uniform, it is also weakly 2δ-differentially uniform, and since uj 6= 0 we obtain
2s−δ−1 < | Im(γˆjuj )| ≤ |Uλ−1 ∩Wj|,
therefore dim(Uλ−1 ∩Wj) ≥ s− d, which contradicts Eq. (7.11).
Notice that in the proof of Theorem 7.2.3 we actually exploited that every
S-box is weakly 2δ-differentially uniform. Hence, we also proved the more
general following result.
Theorem 7.2.4. Let ρ = γλ ∈ Sym(V ) be the generating function of a wave
cipher Φ. If
(i) there exists 1 ≤ δ < s such that for each 1 ≤ j ≤ b the S-box γj is
• weakly 2δ-differentially uniform,
• δ-non-invariant with respect to λ,
(ii) Kerλ =
⊕b
j=1 Kerλ ∩Wj (λ has a parallel kernel),
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then 〈Tn, ρ〉 is primitive (and so it is Γ∞(Φ)).
The hypothesis of each S-box being δ-non-invariant with respect to λ in
Theorem 7.2.3 can be weakened by adding a reasonable requirement on the
diffusion layer. However, for this result does not exist an alternative version
using the weak differential uniformity.
Theorem 7.2.5. Let ρ = γλ ∈ Sym(V ) be the generating function of a wave
cipher Φ. If
(i) there exists 1 ≤ δ < s such that for each 1 ≤ j ≤ b the S-box γj is
• 2δ-differentially uniform,
• (δ − 1)-non-invariant with respect to λ,
(ii) Kerλ =
⊕b
j=1 Kerλ ∩Wj,
(iii) for each 1 ≤ j ≤ b dim(Kerλ ∩Wj) < s− δ,
then 〈Tn, ρ〉 is primitive (and so it is Γ∞(Φ)).
Proof. The proof proceeds exactly as that of Theorem 7.2.3. In this slightly
different setting induced from a further requirement on λ, we can conclude
that U ∩ Vj 6= {0}. Indeed, being
(U ∩ Vj)γj + Kerλ ∩Wj = Uλ−1 ∩Wj,
and having dim(Uλ−1∩Wj) ≥ s−δ and dim(Kerλ∩Wj) < s−δ, there must
be a non-zero element in (U ∩ Vj)γj, and consequently a non-zero element
z ∈ U ∩Vj. Then, reasoning as before, using Lemma 7.2.2 one can prove that
Im(γˆjz) ⊂ Uλ−1 ∩Wj and | Im(γˆjz)| ≥ 2s−δ. Moreover, 0 /∈ Im(γˆjz), since
z 6= 0 and γj is injective. Hence
|Uλ−1 ∩Wj| ≥ 2s−δ + 1,
and therefore dim(Uλ−1 ∩Wj) ≥ s − δ + 1. The hypothesis of (δ − 1)-non-
invariance of γj leads to a contradiction, hence the desired holds.
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Figure 7.2: A 4x5 APN S-box
7.2.1 A wave cipher with a 4x5 APN S-box
Let us now assume n = 16, m = 20, s = 4, t = 5 and b = 4. The function
γ1 : (F2)4 → (F2)5 displayed in Figure 7.2 represents an example of a 4x5
injective function, which is APN, as it can be noted looking at its DDT
displayed in Table 7.3. With an eye on using this function as an S-box
for a wave function, and on using Theorem 7.2.5 to prove the primitivity
of the corresponding group, one has to verify that there exists a diffusion
layer satisfying the hypothesis of Lemma 6.2.2. It holds Im(γ1) ⊂ (F2)5;
moreover it is easy to check that |{a + b | a, b ∈ Im(γ1)}| = 31, and the
missing vector in (F2)5 is ξ
def
= 17x. Assuming that we want to design a 16-
bit generating function for a wave cipher whose confusion layer γ applies 4
copies of the S-box γ1 and whose diffusion layer features a parallel kernel,
it is sufficient to determine a proper diffusion layer λ such that Kerλ =
SpanF2 {(ξ, 0, 0, 0), (0, ξ, 0, 0), (0, 0, ξ, 0), (0, 0, 0, ξ)}, where 0 here denotes the
zero vector in (F2)5. The matrix displayed in Figure 7.4 is an example of
such a layer. The hypothesis (i) of Lemma 6.2.2 is satisfied, hence all the
produced wave functions are bijective, and the given diffusion layer features
a parallel kernel, i.e.
Kerλ =
b⊕
j=1
Kerλ ∩Wj.
Moreover, we checked using MAGMA that γ1 is 0-non-invariant with respect
to Kerλ. Consequently, the hypotheses of Theorem 7.2.5 are satisfied with
δ = 1, and hence the obtained generating function ρ = γλ is such that the
group 〈Tn, ρ〉 is primitive. Then Theorem 7.1.5 implies that the group Γ∞(Φ)
generated by the rounds of a wave cipher having γλ as generating function
is primitive.
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λ
def
=

0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0

Figure 7.4: An example of 20× 16 proper diffusion layer with parallel kernel
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7.3 Conclusions and open problems
In this part of the thesis we proposed a new family of ciphers, called wave
ciphers, whose round functions are the composition of layers not all invert-
ible. Round functions of a wave cipher are wave functions, bijective functions
obtained as the composition of injective non-linear confusion layers enlarging
the message, surjective linear diffusion layers reducing the message size, and
a key addition. Relaxing the requirement that the S-boxes are permutations
allowed to consider APN functions to build confusion layers. In particular
we gave an example of 4 × 5 APN function which can be used as S-box in
a wave cipher. We proposed to use wave functions as F-functions of Feis-
tel Networks, where computing inverse functions is not required in order to
perform decryption. With regard to their security we showed that, under
the assumption that the generating function is invertible, and under suitable
non-linearity properties of the Boolean functions involved, the group gener-
ated by the round functions of a wave ciphers acts primitively.
Several problems arise from this new construction, such as determining con-
ditions on the wave functions to ensure that the group generated by the
round functions of a wave cipher is the alternating or the symmetric group,
or studying the resistance of instances of wave ciphers with respect to other
statistical attacks, for example studying the impact of differential and linear
cryptanalysis on the wave-shaped structure. Moreover, to the best of our
knowledge, s × t APN functions with s < t are not very much investigated
in literature. Finally note that, in order to prove that Γ∞(Φ) = 〈T(0,n), ρ 〉 is
primitive, we adopted the strategy of considering an SPN-like cipher having
as round functions the same wave functions of Φ, and we used Theorem 7.1.5
to deduce the primitivity of Γ∞(Φ) from the primitivity of 〈Tn, ρ〉. This
forced us to suppose ρ ∈ Sym(V ). However, the bijectivity of ρ is not re-
quired to define a wave cipher. More importantly, computer simulations lead
us to think that non-invertible generating functions provide better levels of
non-linearity and consequently better resistance to differential attacks. For
this reason, one of our interests is to prove the same result in more general
hypotheses on ρ.
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